Re Jayden

The appeal concerned the Minister for Community Services and the Director-General of the Department of Community Services, who sought to discharge contact orders to facilitate the transfer of children to New Zealand prior to a final determination of their care and responsibility. The appellant, representing the children, argued that this action constituted an abuse of process. The Supreme Court of New South Wales was required to consider the legal framework governing interim and final care orders under the *Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998* (NSW), and whether the actions of the Minister and Director-General were permissible.

The central legal issues were whether the discharge of interim contact orders by the Children's Court, to enable the removal of children from New South Wales to New Zealand, was an abuse of process, and whether legal practitioners appointed to represent children in the Children's Court should be named as parties in Supreme Court proceedings. The court also examined the distinct requirements for making interim care orders versus final care orders, particularly concerning the necessity of a care plan.

The Court held that the discharge of the interim contact orders was an abuse of process. It reasoned that the *Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998* (NSW) distinguishes between interim and final orders, with specific procedural requirements for each. Notably, a care plan is mandatory before a final order for parental responsibility can be made, but not for an interim order. The court found that the Director-General's actions, by seeking to remove the children from the jurisdiction before a final determination and without a care plan, circumvented the statutory protections afforded to children and the procedural safeguards in the Act. The appeal was upheld, the orders dismissing the appellant's summons and notice of motion were set aside, and the order discharging the interim contact orders was also set aside. The Minister and Director-General were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.