Re Cusack

This matter concerns an application for leave to appeal pursuant to the *Judiciary Act 1903* by Mr P.L. Cusack. Mr Cusack appeared before Brennan J of the High Court of Australia, seeking to persuade the Court to grant leave to appeal, a task he acknowledged was made more difficult by a previous, similar application by Mr Skyring having been refused on essentially the same grounds.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether a prior decision of the Full Court could be distinguished from Mr Cusack's case, or if it had been implicitly overruled. Mr Cusack specifically challenged remarks made by McHugh J, who had noted that Mr Skyring had sought to distinguish the Full Court's judgment by suggesting it had been overruled by implication, and that no specific remarks of the High Court reversing that decision had been referred to.

Brennan J clarified that in law, the term "distinguish" means that cases are so different that a prior decision provides no precedent for the subsequent one. Mr Cusack, representing himself, expressed difficulty with this legal meaning of "distinguish," contrasting it with the ordinary meaning of the word. He referred to his own past success in distinguishing his case before the Supreme Court.