Re: Brownlee

Case [1988] FCA 863


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) Nos. P1666 of 1987
)
DIVISION GENERAL )
RE :  R.A. BROWNLEE
EX PARTE: AGC (ADVANCES)LIMITED

EX-TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BURCHETT J.

In this matter an authority under 6.188 of the
Bankruptcy Act (1966) was signed by the debtor on 14 September

1987, but was not then consented to by Mr Staff, the controlling

trustee named in it. He delayed dealing with it because the
debtor failed to provide for his fees. These having been paid,
on 14 December 1987 he signed a consent to exercise the powers

conferred by the authority.

A meeting of creditors of the debtor was thereupon

called, and called duly so far as all formalities are concerned
apart from the fact that the 20 days period specified in s,194(1)
fixed by s.194(1).
had,already expired, together with a meeting of creditors of the
debtor's husband, and a meeting of their joint creditors. At the
meeting, a composition was approved which involves the payment by
a business as.sociate of the debtor's husband to the trustee of
the sum of $50,000. The trustee now asks me to extend the time

In Re Gowing; ex parte Deputy Registrar in Bankruptcy

(1985) 11 FCR 111, followed in Re Ringuet ex parte Knight (1986)

11 FCR 45, the power of the court to extend this time, even after

its expiry, was affirmed. The question is how I should exercise

my discretion. For the trustee, it is put that the problem
arises from a pure oversight, since the authority (not being in
effect - see section 188(2) - before the trustee consented to it)
could have been re-executed in December, and no-one could have

complained. That this is true was not contested. The opposing

creditor, AGC (Advances) Limited, relied on the terms of s.194,
and on certain alleged problems in connection with the acceptance

by the meeting of the compromise upon which it resolved.

Although the creditor had filed a cross-application, I
was told at the b ginning of the aring that i s

cross-application was based only on the non-compliance with the

time fixed by section 194. In those circumstances, the applicant

had no proper notice of the matters now sought to be relied on in

argument. In any case, I am not satisfied anything has been
shown which should deny the applicant the relief which I would
otherwise grant in this situation.
I think I should exercise my discretion in favour of the
applicant trustee. I extend the time to and including the date
of the meeting.

It seems to me the circumstances are very special. The

creditor asks for an order for its costs on the basis that an
indulgence was sought by the trustee. It was accepted in

argument that the consequences of that would be to diminish the

fund available to the general body of creditors, who have in no

way contributed to the problem, and can only in a very indirect

sense be said to be seeking an indulgence. The basis on which I

1

have made the order extending time is itself rather special, and -.r
was made quite clear by the affidavits which were filed in c. ..
support of the application. In all the circumstances, I think .< .
the proper order is that there be no order as to the costs of any
party. I so order.
I certify that this and the

preceding two ( 2 ) pages are a
true copy of the Reasons for

Judgment herein of his Honour

Justice Burchett.

Associate

Solicitor for the Debtor:  Mr J.P. Pope
Counsel for the Creditor:  Mr P.H. Blackburn-Hart
Solicitors for the Creditor:  Messrs Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Trustee:  Mr J.K. Chippindall
Date of hearing: 31 May 1988
Details
AGLC
Re: Brownlee [1988] FCA 863
Case
[1988] FCA 863
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District Registry, Justice Burchett was called upon to decide on an application by AGC (Advances) Limited to extend the time for convening meetings of creditors for the debtor, R.A. Brownlee. The matter revolved around whether the trustee, Mr Staff, could be granted an extension of time beyond the statutory period stipulated in section 194(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, which had already expired. The trustee had initially failed to provide for his fees, which was a factor that delayed the trustee's consent to the authority signed by the debtor on 14 September 1987. The consent was eventually provided on 14 December 1987, following the payment of the fees, prompting the trustee to convene the meetings of creditors, despite the statutory time limit having lapsed.

The legal issues before the court included whether the court had the discretion to extend the time for convening meetings of creditors beyond the statutory period, and if so, under what circumstances such an extension should be granted. The opposing creditor, AGC (Advances) Limited, argued that the statutory time frame should be strictly adhered to, while the trustee contended that the delay was due to a mere oversight and that no prejudice had been caused to any party. The court had to weigh the statutory requirements against the equities of the case, particularly considering the reasons for the delay and the impact of granting or denying the extension on all creditors involved.

Justice Burchett exercised the discretion in favour of the trustee, extending the time for convening the meetings of creditors to include the date of the meeting. The court found that the circumstances were indeed special, as the delay was due to an oversight rather than any fault of the trustee. Furthermore, the court concluded that there were no grounds to order the trustee to pay the creditor's costs, as such an order would diminish the funds available to the general body of creditors who had not contributed to the oversight. The decision was based on the special nature of the circumstances and the clear explanation provided in the affidavits submitted in support of the application.

In conclusion, the court granted the application to extend the time for convening the meetings of creditors and refused to order costs against any party. This decision reflects a balanced approach, taking into account both statutory requirements and the equities of the situation.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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