Re: Anti Discrimination Act v Corworth P/L

The case of Re: Anti Discrimination Act v Corworth P/L involved a complaint filed under the Anti Discrimination Act 1991 by Alex Nevena Hardie against Corworth Pty Ltd, Coralpay Pty Ltd, and Robert Setterfield. The matter also involved an order by the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal to join Christopher Russell Bilborough and National Asset Planning Corporation Pty Ltd as respondents to the complaint. The appeal against this order was made to the Supreme Court of Queensland. The central issue in the case was whether the time limit for filing a notice of appeal had expired, as stipulated under sections 203 and 217 of the Anti Discrimination Act 1991. The court had to determine the effective date of the Tribunal's decision to join the additional respondents and whether the appeal was lodged within the required 28-day period.

The court examined the timeline of events to ascertain the exact date when the Tribunal's decision was made and communicated. It was established that the decision was communicated to the parties via telephone on 25 March 1999, although the written reasons were dated 17 March 1999. The notice of appeal was filed on 23 April 1999, which was one day beyond the 28-day period from the communication date of 25 March 1999. The court found that the physical delivery of the written reasons was not critical, as long as the parties were notified promptly of the decision. Given that the communication took place on 25 March 1999, the appeal was deemed to be out of time. The court dismissed the summons with costs to be taxed, emphasizing that there was no jurisdiction to extend the time for filing the appeal if it was indeed out of time.

In summary, the Supreme Court of Queensland found that the appeal was not within the statutory time limit, and accordingly, the summons to quash the Tribunal's order was dismissed. The court highlighted the importance of timely communication of decisions to the parties to avoid any confusion regarding the timeliness of appeals. The final order was that the summons was dismissed with costs to be taxed, reflecting the court's view that the appeal was not lodged within the required period.