R v Tranter

The case of *R v Tranter* concerned an appeal against conviction for attempting to import a marketable quantity of a border controlled precursor, pseudoephedrine. The dispute arose after police intercepted a crate arriving from Thailand, replaced the secreted pseudoephedrine with an inert substance, and allowed the crate to proceed to a car wash owned by a co-accused. The appellant collected the crate, and it was later discovered on his farm. The appeal was heard by Kourakis CJ, White and Peek JJ.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the appellant could be lawfully convicted of attempting to import the precursor, particularly given that the police had substituted an inert substance for the pseudoephedrine before the appellant took possession of the crate. This raised questions about whether the appellant's conduct needed to be anterior to the importation itself, and whether the full substitution of the illicit substance precluded a conviction for attempt. Further issues included whether the Information improperly charged separate importations for each accused, and whether the appellant was prejudiced by the cross-examination of his co-accused and the admission of certain telephone conversations in his absence.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had received a fair trial. The court reasoned that the extended definition of "import" in the *Criminal Code 1995* (Cth), which includes "deal with the substance in connection with its importation," permitted a prosecution for an attempted dealing with the substance even after the importation had technically been completed. The court found that the appellant's conduct constituted a perfected and completed dealing with the substituted inert substance, and that the impossibility of obtaining the actual precursor due to police actions did not prevent a conviction for attempt, referencing s 11.1(4) of the *Criminal Code 1995* (Cth). The court also determined that there was only one importation and the Information validly charged different particulars for each accused, that the appellant was not prejudiced by the cross-examination of his co-accused, and that the trial judge did not err in admitting evidence of telephone conversations, as they served as circumstantial evidence of the appellant's mental state and the jury was properly directed.