| JAMES ALBERT TAYLOR | Applicant |
| BRISBANE ..DATE 30/09/92 | |
| 300992 D.l |
COURT OF APPEAL [1992] QCA 441
PINCUS JA
McPHERSON JA
MOYNIHAN J
CA No 257 of 1992
THE QUEEN
v.
JUDGMENT which to apply for leave to appeal. The applicant, Mr Taylor, was sentenced to 2 years 6 months imprisonment on 31 July 1992 in the District Court at Brisbane. He was convicted of numerous offences and had others taken into account, and I will come to the details of that shortly.
He is 20 years of age, having been born in March 1972. His criminal history, briefly,consists of offences of unlawful use of a motor vehicle on a number of occasions, breaking entering and stealing in November 1990, stealing in December 1990 and attempted false pretences in the same month. In addition to that his record includes a breach of probation for which he was convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment in April 1991, and a breach of the Bail Act for which he was convicted and sentenced in March 1992. Mr Taylor has informed us that the breach of the Bail Act was due to a misunderstanding.
When Mr Taylor was recently sentenced, he was indicted in respect of one offence of forgery, one of uttering, one of receiving and 6 breaking, entering and stealing. In addition he had taken into account under section 651, 40 other offences, 3 of receiving, 10 of forgery, 15 of stealing, 10 of uttering and 2 of false pretences. As to the offences in the indictment, the first 3 of them related to a cheque leaf which had been stolen and it was received by the applicant. He completed the cheque in the sum of $680-odd, deposited to a bank and withdrew it. The 6 breaking, entering and stealings occurred over a period of about 4 months and related to business premises and property to a value in excess of $3,000 was stolen.
As to the 40 other offences, it appears that the applicant received stolen compact discs and pawned them. He also stole bank access cards and keycards, received a stolen cheque book, forged cheques using the stolen keycards and obtained a sum of some $4,000-odd. It is said that some of those offences were committed after he had been interviewed by the police on other matters.
Mr Taylor has informed us today that because of personal circumstances, he desires to have a period shorter than the ordinary period set within which he may obtain parole. He does not complain of the 2 years and 6 months imprisonment and indeed it does not seem possible to do so. He says that he has, for example, a job available to him and for that reason it would be desirable to set a period of say 12 months, after which he may be granted parole instead of the 15 months which would follow under the statute.
It is my opinion that, whereas I can understand Mr Taylor's desire, because of the personal circumstances which he relies on, to get out of gaol sooner than the time of 15 months which I have mentioned, there does not seem to be any legal basis on which that could be ordered. The sentence is admitted to be a proper one. There are no particular circumstances relating to the sentences which would justify early parole and the personal matters which Mr Taylor has mentioned would not in themselves justify it.
Putting the matter at the legal level, the Judge has proper]y exercised his discretion and there is no basis upon which we could interfere. I would be in favour of refusing the application.
McPHERSON JA: So would I be. I agree with what has been said.
MOYNIHAN SJA: So do I.
PINCUS JA: The order of the Court is application for an extension of time refused.
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- AGLC
- R v Taylor [1992] QCA 441
- Case
- [1992] QCA 441
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the applicant's personal circumstances justified an earlier parole eligibility date than the statutory minimum of 15 months. The Court considered whether the applicant's personal situation provided a basis for reducing the parole eligibility period, despite the sentence being deemed proper and the absence of any particular circumstances relating to the sentence that would justify early parole. The Court also needed to determine if there were grounds to interfere with the Judge's discretion in this matter.
The Court of Appeal found that there was no legal basis to order an earlier parole eligibility period for the applicant. Pincus JA, McPHerson JA, and Moynihan JA all agreed that the applicant's desire to obtain parole sooner due to personal circumstances did not justify interfering with the Judge's properly exercised discretion. The Court concluded that the applicant's personal situation alone did not warrant a deviation from the statutory requirements for parole eligibility. As a result, the Court refused the application for an extension of time to obtain parole.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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