R v Stakaj & N, H

This matter concerned an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions to expunge or quash jury verdicts of acquittal for murder, and consequently set aside convictions for manslaughter, entered against the defendants David Zefi, Rrok Jakaj, Dario Stakaj, and HN. The defendants were charged with murder following a fatal stabbing incident outside a nightclub. Following a jury trial, the trial judge entered verdicts of not guilty of murder and guilty of manslaughter for each defendant. The Director sought to tender affidavits from the jurors, including the foreperson, to demonstrate that the majority verdicts of not guilty of murder were erroneously returned, arguing that the jury had not in fact reached a majority decision to acquit on that charge.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether it possessed the inherent jurisdiction to hear an application to expunge or quash recorded jury verdicts, particularly acquittals, and if so, whether the evidence of the jurors could be admitted to establish that the verdicts were erroneously returned. The Court was required to consider the fundamental common law right to trial by jury, the strict construction of statutory modifications to this right, such as majority verdicts under section 57 of the Juries Act 1927 (SA), and the distinction between a miscarriage of justice caused by a "false" verdict and the inability to set aside a judgment of acquittal.

The Court reasoned that while the right to trial by jury, including unanimity, is a fundamental common law right, section 57 of the Juries Act permits majority verdicts of not guilty in certain circumstances. However, the Court found that the Director's application did not concern a failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 57, but rather alleged that a "false" verdict of acquittal was returned when the jury had not resolved to do so. The Court held that while a miscarriage of justice caused by a false verdict could be remedied on an appeal against conviction, there is no power to set aside a judgment of acquittal.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the Director's application to set aside the judgments of acquittal for murder and the subsequent convictions for manslaughter. The Court also dismissed a further application by the Director pursuant to section 350 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) to refer questions of law to the Full Court, finding that the validity of judgments that finally dispose of criminal proceedings is not a matter for a trial judge to reserve.