R v Schulz

The appeal concerned a criminal conviction arising from an incident on 17 September 2014. The appellant, R v Schulz, was accused of striking Mr Wahlstedt with a machete. The prosecution's case relied on eyewitness accounts of the confrontation, which concluded with Mr Wahlstedt being struck twice to the head. The appellant maintained he struck the machete in self-defence or accidentally while attempting to warn Mr Wahlstedt away. The South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal was required to determine whether the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the appellant's evidence and the onus of proof were legally sound.

The central legal issue was whether the trial judge's summing up had misdirected the jury on the burden of proof and the use of the appellant's defence evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that the judge repeatedly limited the jury's consideration of his evidence to situations where they accepted it, effectively instructing them to disregard his testimony unless it was fully accepted and to then consider the prosecution's evidence in isolation. This, it was contended, improperly shifted the onus of proof and prevented the jury from considering whether the appellant's evidence, even if not fully accepted, might still raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Criminal Appeal, comprising Vanstone, Blue, and Lovell JJ, found that the trial judge's directions were erroneous. Applying the principles established in *Liberato v The Queen* and *Douglass v The Queen*, the Court held that the jury must understand that defence evidence does not lose its force simply because it is not "accepted" or "positively believed." The jury must be directed that even if they do not believe the defence evidence, they cannot find an issue against the accused contrary to that evidence if it gives rise to a reasonable doubt. The judge's directions had created a false dichotomy, obliging the appellant to satisfy the jury of his evidence's acceptance as a prerequisite to its consideration, thereby steering the jury away from its potential to raise reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the appellant's conviction, finding that the misdirection went to a fundamental matter and vitiated the trial. A new trial was ordered, and the application for leave to appeal against sentence was rendered unnecessary and therefore dismissed.