R v Rouse (No 2) Summary

Serial No 67/1990
List "A"

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)

CITATION: R v Rouse (No 2) [1990] TASSC 68; A67/1990

PARTIES:  R
  v
  ROUSE, Edmund Alexander

FILE NO/S:  CCA25/1990
DELIVERED ON:  29 October 1990
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
JUDGMENT OF:  Cox, Underwood and Wright JJ

Judgment Number: A67/1990
Number of paragraphs: 5

Serial No 67/1990
List "A"
File No CCA25/1990

R v EDMUND ALEXANDER ROUSE (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

COX J
UNDERWOOD J
WRIGHT J
29 October 1990

While there is statutory authority for the payment of costs by the convicted person of his prosecution and trial and by either party to an appeal or application for leave to appeal, the practice of the court is not to make such orders save where a clear case is made out.

The general principle underlying this practice is that the Crown should neither be inhibited nor encouraged in the prosecution of proceedings in the Criminal Courts by the prospect of gaining or losing the costs of those proceedings. Such observations as the High Court has recently made concerning the payment of costs by the Crown when an unsuccessful applicant for special leave to appeal from a State Court of Criminal Appeal, which is normally the final arbiter of appeals, have no bearing on the issue before this court.

The principle remains that the discretion is unfettered, but the applicant for costs must establish a proper basis for its exercise.

In our view, there are no circumstances which warrant the making of an order. The application has not been shown to be not bona fide, nor was it a frivolous application or one lacking in any merit. The offence was serious, there was no guidance to be had from any established sentencing practice, and it was a matter of sufficient public importance to make the application a responsible one, even though it was, in fact, unsuccessful.

The application is therefore refused.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Tasmania, the Court of Criminal Appeal heard an application for costs from Edmund Alexander Rouse, who had been convicted and was appealing against his conviction. The court was asked to determine whether the costs of the appeal should be awarded to the appellant, as is permitted under statute. The appeal itself pertained to the appellant's conviction for a serious offence, and although the appellant's application for costs was ultimately unsuccessful, the court considered the matter carefully.

The legal issue before the court was the discretion to award costs in an appeal against conviction, where the Crown is the respondent. The court noted that while there is statutory authority for such an order, the usual practice is not to make it unless a clear case is made out. The court had to balance the principle that the Crown should not be influenced by the prospect of gaining or losing costs against the appellant's entitlement to seek costs if the application was justified.

The court found that the appellant had not demonstrated any circumstances warranting the exercise of the court's discretion. The application was bona fide, not frivolous, and the offence was of sufficient public importance to justify the appeal. Although the application was unsuccessful, the court considered it a responsible one. Consequently, the court refused the application for costs, adhering to its usual practice in such matters.

R v Rouse (No 2)

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established