R v Pringle

The appeal concerned the conviction of the appellant for trafficking in a large commercial quantity of a controlled drug, contrary to section 32(1) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984. The conviction followed a jury trial where the prosecution's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the discovery of 38.2 kg of cannabis in a locked shipping container located on business premises owned and operated by the appellant. The appellant was the sole shareholder and director of the company, and the container had been purchased in a business name registered to him. The appeal was heard by Kelly, Nicholson, and Hinton JJ.

The court was required to determine several grounds of appeal, including whether the trial had miscarried due to the wrongful admission of evidence, particularly in light of section 34P of the Evidence Act 1929. Further issues included whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the use of discreditable conduct evidence under section 34R of the Evidence Act 1929, whether there was a misdirection concerning an element of the trafficking offence, and whether the jury had been improperly invited to consider mutually exclusive pathways to a guilty verdict. The court also considered whether a failure to give an extended unanimity direction constituted a miscarriage of justice, and whether the guilty verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence.

The court addressed the admissibility of evidence concerning a grow room found at the appellant's premises, which tended to suggest discreditable conduct. The court found that this evidence had a permissible use probative of a fact in issue, independently of any impermissible propensity use. Even if characterised as relying on a propensity, the court was satisfied it possessed strong probative value and that its prejudicial effect was substantially outweighed by its permissible use, which could be kept distinct from any impermissible use, satisfying the requirements of section 34P(2)(a) and (3). The evidence of the grow room equipment, along with cannabis leaves, smell, and mugginess, was considered sufficient to permit a strong inference that the room was used for growing cannabis, with no plausible alternative use suggested by the appellant.