R v Place

The appeal concerned the admissibility of certain evidence in a criminal trial. The appellant, R v Place, was charged with indecent assault. The complainant, EK, gave evidence of the alleged assaults and also of a complaint she made to her then-boyfriend, Mr Jarrod Bottomley, when she was approximately 17 years old. The prosecution also sought to admit evidence of other uncharged acts of similar conduct by the appellant.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the evidence of the complaint made by EK to Mr Bottomley was admissible, and whether evidence of other uncharged acts of indecent touching by the appellant should have been admitted at trial. The court was required to consider the application of section 34M of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) regarding complaint evidence and the principles governing the admissibility of propensity or tendency evidence, including evidence of uncharged acts.

The court held that complaint evidence is admissible under section 34M of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) if it refers to the sexual offence charged, serving to buttress the complainant's evidence by demonstrating consistency. While the complaint need not detail the specific occasion charged, there must be an identifiable link between the complaint and the offence. In this case, despite some inconsistencies between EK's recollection and Mr Bottomley's evidence regarding the complaint, the court found that the complaint evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect and therefore should not have been excluded. Regarding the uncharged acts, the court determined that evidence of approximately ten occasions of similar conduct, including the charged offences, was admissible on counts 2 to 4. This evidence was admitted on the basis that it formed part of a wider course of conduct by the appellant, which explained the complainant's uncertainty about the precise order of events and her delay in complaining. The court noted that the uncharged acts and charged offences relied on the complainant's evidence equally, and the jury was properly directed on the distinction between the counts.

The appeal was dismissed. The court found that the trial judge had correctly admitted the complaint evidence and the evidence of uncharged acts, as these were relevant to the credibility of the complainant and the explanation of her conduct within the context of the alleged offending.