R v MAS

This case concerned an appeal by the appellant, R v MAS, against his conviction for sexual offences. The complainant, referred to as D, gave evidence alleging that the appellant had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions over several years, commencing when she was a child. The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Kourakis CJ, Peek and Blue JJ.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge had erred in failing to adequately direct the jury regarding inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and whether it would be unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. Specifically, the appellant argued that the trial judge should have provided substantive directions drawing the jury's attention to particular inconsistencies in D's testimony, rather than simply stating that it would be unsafe to convict on uncorroborated evidence.

The Full Court held that while a judge is not required to warn a jury that it is unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence trial, something more than the mere absence of corroboration is generally required to establish an appealable error in refusing such a warning. However, the court found that the trial judge's directions on the specific matters relied upon as particulars of the appeal were inadequate. The court emphasised the importance of a trial judge bringing significant evidential issues to the jury's attention. In this case, the numerous and significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence raised a real question about the reliability of her testimony as a whole. The judge's brief observation about a single inconsistency was insufficient, and the jury should have been directed that they were entitled to reject her evidence or find it an unreliable foundation for a guilty verdict, particularly given the entirely uncorroborated nature of the evidence and the significant passage of time since the alleged events.

The Court concluded that the trial judge's inadequate directions denied the appellant a real chance of acquittal on one of the counts. The appeal was allowed, the conviction on count 2 was quashed, and a retrial was ordered for counts 1 and 3.