R v Lam (No 27)

Case [2005] VSC 412


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1505 of 2003

THE QUEEN
v
CUONG LAM & ORS

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JUDGE:

Redlich J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

24 January 2005 to 19 September 2005

DATE OF RULING:

21 July 2005

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

R v Lam & Ors

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2005] VSC 412

RULING NO. 27

Application to discharge jury because of interruptions to defence counsel’s closing address through jury illness – No prejudice to accused – No high degree of necessity to discharge.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Crown Mr M. Dean S.C. with Mr P. Southey Mr  S. Carisbrooke, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For Cuong Quoc Lam Mr S. Grant Michael Gleeson & Associates
For Hung Tu Van Mr A. Jackson Haines & Polities
For Linh Van Nguyen Mr D. Brustman Valos Black & Associates
For Thanh Nha Nguyen Mr F. Gucciardo Theo Magazis & Associates
For Long Thanh Tran Mr G. Mullaly Victoria Legal Aid
For Hong Bui Mr J. Saunders Valos Black & Associates
For Hoang Tran Mr M. Rochford Brendan Wilkinson

HIS HONOUR:

  1. Application has been made by counsel on behalf of the accused Hung Tu Van that he be discharged from this trial on the basis that the closing address of counsel has been so fragmented that it will work to the serious disadvantage of the accused.  The implication of the submission is that the disruption to, and fragmentation of, the address has caused irremediable prejudice.  The submission was brief and beyond stating the basis for the application nothing of substance was said in support of the application.

  1. This trial is now in its 109th day.  The jury, who are very attentive, have taken copious notes throughout the entirety of the evidence.  Their note taking endeavours have not diminished throughout the course of counsel’s closing addresses.

  1. I can see no reason why the fragmentation of Mr Jackson’s address will enure to Hung Tu Van’s prejudice.  The address has a great deal to commend it, in its detailed analysis and presentation.  In my view, the fact that it has been interrupted will serve to advantage Mr Jackson’s client.  The jury has an opportunity to consider in measured fashion what has been said during each period.  Mr Jackson will no doubt continue to analyse in detail the evidence of each witness who has given an account potentially adverse to Hung Van.  There is little risk, with these breaks, that the jury will overlook the importance of the many points which Mr Jackson has raised and which the jury may not have previously considered during the trial.  Mr Jackson may, if he wishes, remind the jury of arguments already made in such detail as he sees fit.  He has already done so after one such interruption. 

  1. It is my intention in my charge to give the jury a reasonably full summary of the evidence.  That necessity arises, partly because of the length of the trial, partly because of the nature of the evidence and also because of the content of the closing addresses.  I also intend to refer to counsel’s closing addresses in substantial detail.  I hope I will do Mr Jackson’s address no injustice when I try and remind the jury of all of the major points which Mr Jackson has made.  I will also refer to some of those arguments at various points during the charge when dealing with evidence which has been the subject of comment by counsel and when relating the law to the facts. 

  1. I am not satisfied that there is any risk of injustice or that a high degree of necessity has been shown to discharge the accused.

Details
AGLC
R v Lam (No 27) [2005] VSC 412
Case
[2005] VSC 412
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Lam (No 27) involved an application made by the defence to discharge the jury due to interruptions in the defence counsel's closing address caused by illnesses within the jury. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The application was brought under the provisions of the Sentencing Act 1991, specifically section 118A, which allows for the discharge of a jury if there is a high degree of necessity to do so.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the interruptions to the defence counsel's closing address, due to the jury's illnesses, had caused such prejudice to the accused that it warranted discharging the jury. The defence argued that the interruptions had disrupted the flow of the closing address and potentially prejudiced the accused's right to a fair trial. The prosecution countered that the interruptions had not caused significant prejudice to the accused and that there was no high degree of necessity to discharge the jury.

The court considered the nature and extent of the interruptions, the content of the defence counsel's address, and the potential impact on the jury's decision-making process. The court found that the interruptions, while inconvenient, did not reach the threshold of causing significant prejudice to the accused. The court noted that the defence counsel had been able to complete their address and that the jury had been appropriately directed by the trial judge to disregard the interruptions. Consequently, the court held that there was no high degree of necessity to discharge the jury.

In light of the above, the application to discharge the jury was dismissed. The jury continued to deliberate, and the trial proceeded to its conclusion without further incident.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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