R v LAL

The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentences imposed upon him by the District Court of Queensland, which were two counts of indecent treatment of a child under 12. The applicant had committed the offences when he was a child, aged about 15 years and seven months, but was convicted and sentenced as an adult. He was sentenced to imprisonment for four months for count 1 and nine months for count 2, to be served concurrently, wholly suspended, for an operational period of nine months, with both sentences carrying convictions. The applicant sought in lieu of the sentences, the penalty sought at first instance of probation with no convictions recorded.

The court was required to determine whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and whether the court should have considered sentencing the applicant as a child. The court was required to consider section 144 of the Youth Justice Act 1992, which required the Court to have regard to the sentence that might have been imposed on the applicant if he had been sentenced as a child. The court was also required to consider the principles contained in sections 4 and 109 of the Juvenile Justice Act 1992, which would have applied had the applicant been sentenced as a child, including that detention was a last resort.

The court found that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the court should have considered sentencing the applicant as a child. The court found that the applicant's age at the time of the offence and the impact of recording a conviction on his chances of rehabilitation and finding or retaining employment were relevant considerations. The court found that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive because they did not reflect the primary position that a conviction is not to be recorded against a child offender. The court found that the applicant's age at the time of the offence and the impact of recording a conviction on his chances of rehabilitation and finding or retaining employment were relevant considerations.

The application for leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed. The sentences imposed at first instance were set aside. In lieu thereof, the applicant was to be released upon his entering into a recognisance, in the sum of $500, on the condition that he be of good behaviour and appear for conviction and sentence if called upon at any time during the next two months. No convictions were recorded.