R v Johnston

In the case of R v Johnston, the appellant, Vicki Marie Johnston, appealed against the sentence imposed on her for the manslaughter of her infant son, K, by criminal negligence. The sentencing judge had sentenced Johnston to imprisonment for 10 years and 6 months, with a non-parole period of 6 years. Johnston argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the judge had sentenced her on an incorrect basis, among other grounds. The central issues before the court were whether the starting point for the sentence was too high, whether the judge had based the sentence on incorrect principles, and whether the need for general deterrence had been overemphasised compared to the personal circumstances of Johnston.

The court found that the starting point used by the sentencing judge was too high and that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court acknowledged that the neglect leading to the child's death was severe, but argued that the sentencing judge had not adequately considered the personal circumstances of Johnston and had placed too much emphasis on the need for general deterrence. The court noted that Johnston had been made aware of the dangers of malnutrition from a previous incident involving another child. The comparison with other sentences for manslaughter in similar cases further indicated that the starting point of 12 years was excessive. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to imprisonment for 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence imposed on Johnston. The court substituted a sentence of imprisonment for 7 years and 6 months, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months, effective from the date Johnston was taken into custody. This decision highlights the importance of considering both the gravity of the offence and the personal circumstances of the offender when determining an appropriate sentence. The court's decision also underscores the need for consistency in sentencing, particularly in relation to the starting point for sentences in cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence.