R v Hanvey

[1992] QCA 307

(See also judgment following dated 11/11/92)

COURT OF APPEAL  [1992] QCA 307

MACROSSAN CJ
DAVIES JA
AMBROSE J

CA No 183 of 1992

THE QUEEN

v.

STEPHEN ERIC HANVEY  Applicant

BRISBANE

..DATE 09/09/92

JUDGMENT

090992
THE CHIEF JUSTICE:    This is an application for extension of time within which to appeal.  The last day for lodging the appeal was 9 June 1992 and we are told that the lodging, filing and service was not completed until the 17th of that month.  The applicant then was a little over a week out of time.

However, he explains the lateness of the action.  It was not due to any personal fault of his.  It was due to actions taken or omissions, more accurately, within the office of his solicitor.  The applicant refers to it as an oversight on the solicitor’s part.  The solicitor handling the matter in his affidavit refers to it as a misunderstanding.

In any event the omission in question occurred in association with a trip taken overseas by the solicitor handling the matter.  In the circumstances, the Crown not opposing the application for extension, I am of the view that it should be granted.

DAVIES JA:    I agree.

AMBROSE J:    I agree also.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE:    The application for extension of time to appeal against conviction is accordingly granted.
  - - - - - -

COURT OF APPEAL

PINCUS JA
McPHERSON JA
de JERSEY J

CA No 183 of 1992

THE QUEEN

v.

STEPHEN ERIC HANVEY  Appellant

BRISBANE

..DATE 11/11/92

JUDGMENT

111192 D.1

de JERSEY J: The appellant appeals against his conviction for the offence of wilful and unlawful damage to a car, the property of one Desley Stour between 15 June and 20 July 1991 at Cairns.  He was acquitted on 2 other counts.  They were that he also damaged that vehicle at an earlier time in February 1991 and secondly a count of extortion demanding money with threats in the course of a telephone conversation on 6 September 1991.  The evidence disclosed that the appellant was a former client of Mr Stour, a Cairns solicitor, that they undertook a separate venture which was unsuccessful and led to a dispute about money.  While that dispute was current, on 6 February 1991 Mr Stour discovered that vehicles under his house had been damaged by a yellow substance corroding the paintwork.  That evidence formed the basis of the count of wilful damage to property first in time on which the appellant was acquitted.

Mr Stour went on holidays with his family between 17 June and 19 July 1991.  when he returned he discovered further damage to one of the vehicles.  That relates to the count of damage to property on which the appellant was convicted.  The important evidence against the appellant arose from Mr Stour’s account of a telephone conversation of 6 September 1991 in which on Mr Stour’s account the appellant demanded $5,000 and said “You’ve seen what damage I have done to your car.  If you don’t pay up, you will see what acid can do to your little girl’s face.”

Now, the appellant was acquitted on the count of extortion but clearly the jury was entitled to rely upon that admission of doing damage as a sufficient foundation for a conviction on the count of unlawful damage to property committed during the period of - during the period when the Stours were on holidays.  That period was much closer in time to the September telephone conversation than was, of course, the earlier alleged damage to property back in February 1991.  The jury may well have felt that that provided a safer foundation for a conviction on the count in respect of the June to July allegation of damage than it would have for the count of the doing of damage at the much earlier time.

There is, therefore, an explanation as to why the jury might properly have convicted on the later count of doing damage to the property yet acquitted on the earlier one.  There was sufficient basis for the conviction.  I have dealt with the matter in this way because that was - the suggestion of inconsistency between the verdict was really the only matter which was touched upon to any extent in the course of submissions before us.  That being so, I would dismiss the appeal.

PINCUS JA: I agree

McPHERSON JA: I agree.

PINCUS JA: The order of the Court is appeal dismissed.