R v Grundy

The case of *R v Grundy* concerned an application for permission to appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions against a sentencing order made by a judge in South Australia. The respondent had been found guilty of possessing a firearm without a licence, a serious firearm offence, and was sentenced to nine months imprisonment. The sentencing judge had exercised discretion under section 71 of the *Sentencing Act 2017* (SA) to order that the sentence be served by way of home detention. The Director contended that section 70(1)(b)(ii)(D) of the Act precluded the imposition of a home detention order for such an offence.

The central legal issue before the court was whether section 70(1)(b)(ii)(D) of the *Sentencing Act 2017* (SA) operated to prohibit the making of a home detention order when sentencing an offender for a serious firearm offence. This required an interpretation of the interplay between section 70(1)(b)(ii)(D) and section 51(1)(c) of the Act, which deals with the narrowing of sentencing options for serious firearm offences.

The court, per Doyle JA, dismissed the application for permission to appeal. It reasoned that the disapplication of section 25 of the *Sentencing Act* by section 51(1)(c) was not an express prohibition against the reduction, mitigation, or substitution of penalties. Instead, it merely prevented the utilisation of the general power under section 25. Consequently, the disqualification of section 25 by section 51(1)(c) did not trigger the preclusionary effect of section 70(1)(b)(ii)(D). The court held that this left open the court's discretionary power under section 71 to make a home detention order, as such an order is made under specific powers rather than the general power under section 25. The court also noted that any real ambiguity in a penal provision should be resolved in favour of the accused.

The Director's application for permission to appeal was dismissed.