R v Galvin; Ex parte Metal Trades Employers' Association

This case concerned an application by the Federated Ship Painters' and Dockers' Union for a variation of an existing award to include a fifteen-minute tea break two hours after the usual starting time. The Metal Trades Employers' Association and other respondents sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a conciliation commissioner, John Michael Galvin, from hearing this application. The core of the dispute was whether the proposed tea break constituted an alteration of "standard hours of work" within the meaning of the *Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1947*, a power exclusively vested in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, not conciliation commissioners.

The legal issues before the High Court of Australia were whether the proposed insertion of a fifteen-minute tea break constituted an alteration of the standard hours of work in the industry, and consequently, whether the conciliation commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear the union's application. The prosecutors argued that any remission of working time, even for a short, regular break, amounted to an alteration of standard hours, which commissioners were statutorily prohibited from making under section 13 of the Act. The respondent union contended that such breaks were merely conditions of employment or amenities, not an alteration of standard hours, and that section 16 of the Act allowed commissioners to proceed with matters even when jurisdiction was in doubt, subject to referral to the Court.

The Court held that the insertion of a fifteen-minute tea break, allowed regularly two hours after the usual starting time, constituted an alteration of the standard hours of work in the industry. The Court reasoned that "standard hours of work" referred to the net period during which employees were liable to perform their duties, and any provision that reduced this period, even for a break, was an alteration. The Court rejected the argument that section 16 of the Act provided a bar to prohibition, finding it did not enlarge a commissioner's jurisdiction but merely provided a mechanism for obtaining guidance from the Court. The Court also determined that the occupation of ship painters and dockers constituted an "industry" for the purposes of the Act.

Consequently, the Court made the order absolute, prohibiting the conciliation commissioner from proceeding with the hearing of the union's application. The Court found that the union's proper course was to make its application for a tea break to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. The costs of the prosecutors were ordered to be paid by the respondent union.