R v Douglas

In the case of R v Douglas, the appellant, Douglas, was convicted of eight counts of child sexual offences and sought to appeal the convictions on the basis that the trial judge failed to give an adequate Longman direction to the jury. The complainant's evidence indicated that the offending conduct dated back to when the complainant was ten years old, with the complaint only being made when the complainant was almost 17 years old. The trial judge acknowledged the passing of time and directed the jury to carefully scrutinise the complainant's evidence before arriving at a conclusion of guilt, but did not use the words "dangerous to convict" in accordance with the Longman direction.

The legal issue for the court to decide was whether the trial judge's direction to the jury was inadequate, such that it caused a miscarriage of justice. The Longman direction is a warning to the jury that it would be dangerous to convict on the complainant's evidence alone unless the jury, after scrutinising the evidence with great care, considering the circumstances relevant to its evaluation, and paying heed to the warning, are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of its truth and accuracy. The court considered the authorities and relevant factors, including the existence of corroboration or support for the complainant's evidence, the length of the delay, the age of the complainant at the time of the offending, and the compliance of the warning otherwise given by the trial judge with Longman.

The court concluded that the trial judge's direction was not inadequate and did not cause a miscarriage of justice. The court found that the risk of a miscarriage of justice identified in Longman is the loss of the means of testing the allegations which would otherwise have been open, and that the Longman direction addresses that risk by means of a warning to which the jury are told to pay heed, rather than a mere comment. The court also found that the warning given by the trial judge was otherwise compliant with Longman independent of the failure to use the words "dangerous to convict". The appeal was dismissed.