R v Crehan

[1992] QCA 130

COURT OF APPEAL	[1992] QCA 130
PINCUS JA DAVIES JA DERRINGTON J
CA No 27 of 1992
THE QUEEN v. TIMOTHY WAYNE CREHAN

Applicant

BRISBANE

... DATE 12/5/92

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J: On 13 January 1992 the applicant was convicted in the Maroochydore District Court of 43 counts of breaking and entering and stealing, 15 counts of breaking and entering with intent, one count of stealing and one count of possession of housebreaking implements. They were committed on various dates between 26 August and December 1991.

At the time he was on parole having been sentenced, effectively, on 20 May 1988 to a term which was reduced on appeal to imprisonment for four years with a recommendation for parole after 31 January 1989. Consequently, he was on parole at the time that he committed the offences. He was taken back into custody in December 1991. He is technically eligible to apply for parole in January 1994 but has been told, he says, that his chances are not good, which is understandable, and if he fails to receive the benefits of parole, he will not be released until 2 January 1995.

The sentences which were imposed by the learned sentencing Judge were seven years' imprisonment in respect of each of the counts of breaking and entering and stealing, seven years of imprisonment on the counts of breaking and entering with intent, one year in respect of the count of stealing and two years and six months in respect of the count of possession of housebreaking implements. His Honour really imposed these sentences in respect of the last two matters individually but then regarded the 43 counts of breaking and entering and stealing and the 15 counts of breaking and entering with intent, together, as a cumulative group of offences of 58 counts of breaking and entering with various success.

The applicant claims that it was not taken into account that his excuse for committing these offences was that at the relevant time he could not find the means to survive because he was receiving no unemployment benefits because he could not properly identify himself. The record reveals that His Honour did, indeed, take those matters into account. It is reasonably clear that he did not make very much allowance for that excuse, taking into account the long criminal history of the applicant, notwithstanding that he is only 21 years of age now; and taking into account, further, the many offences of this nature that he has committed in the past; and taking into account, further, that he was on parole at the relevant time. His Honour obviously saw very little in the way of excuse in the reason that the applicant gave to him.

The sentences that were imposed by His Honour, however, carried in addition a recommendation that the applicant be considered for release on parole on 1 September 1994. In view of his eligibility to apply for parole in respect of the earlier charges on which he was sentenced and on which he was on parole at the relevant time, and taking into account that the eligibility for parole that His Honour has recommended, it really involves a period of only nine months in respect of all these fresh matters, so it is impossible to suggest that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

The period of seven years imprisonment that constitutes the head sentence is very much consistent with what has been said over some years now in respect of people who carry out a series of breaking and entering offences by way of a professional pastime.

The recommendation for early parole reflects His Honour's appreciation of the youth of the applicant, and the fact that he will have been spending some reasonably lengthy period of time in prison as a consecutive course of events pursuant to his imprisonment on the earlier charge and these present charges. His Honour appears to have taken into account all relevant issues that might be said to favour the accused and to have given him reasonable consideration accordingly.

In my view, then, there is no substance in any of the arguments proposed. The application for leave to appeal should be refused.

PINCUS JA: I agree, and would add only that in my opinion the
sentence imposed by the learned District Court Judge was well
within the range of reasonableness and I, too, would be inclined
to dismiss the application.
DAVIES JA: I agree.

PINCUS JA: The order of the Court will be that the application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

-------