R v Copeland (No 2)

This case concerned an appeal against sentence brought by the appellant, who had been found guilty by a jury of using a motor vehicle without consent, attempted armed robbery, and three counts of aggravated armed robbery. The sentencing judge imposed a single term of imprisonment of 16 years, with a non-parole period of 10 years, pursuant to section 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). The appellant argued that the sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive and that the sentencing judge had erred in their application of section 18A.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the sentencing judge had correctly applied section 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) in fixing a single aggregate sentence for multiple offences, and whether the resulting sentence was manifestly excessive. Specifically, the court considered whether the judge was required to determine notional individual sentences for each offence before imposing the single sentence under section 18A, and whether the totality principle had been appropriately applied.

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Gray, White, and Kourakis JJ, held that the sentencing judge had made no error of principle. The court noted that while it is generally desirable to determine notional individual sentences and consider their concurrency or cumulation before imposing an aggregate sentence under section 18A, this approach may be unnecessary in certain circumstances, such as when the totality principle clearly operates to reduce the otherwise appropriate sentence. The court found that the sentencing judge had considered all material matters, including the appellant's extensive criminal record and the nature of the offending, and that no extraneous or irrelevant matters had influenced the sentencing process.

Ultimately, the Full Court dismissed the appeal. It concluded that, given the course of criminal conduct and the appellant's prior record, the single sentence of 16 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years was within the sentencing discretion of the judge and was not manifestly excessive.