R v Bloodsworth; R v Errington (No 2)

The appeal was brought by two respondents, Bloodsworth and Errington, against their convictions in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Bloodsworth was convicted of murder, while Errington was convicted of being an accessory to murder after the fact. The issue at the heart of this case was the admissibility of evidence obtained through the illegal interception of telephone conversations. The respondents argued that the evidence should not be admitted because it was obtained in breach of the Telecommunications (Intercepttion and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). The court had to determine whether the evidence was admissible despite the illegality of its procurement, and whether the prejudice to Bloodsworth arising from her request for "crack" cocaine was such that the evidence should be excluded.

The court held that the intercepted telephone conversations that were made with the knowledge of the parties were admissible because they were not illegally obtained. However, the conversations that were intercepted without the knowledge of Bloodsworth were considered to be illegally obtained. Despite this, the court found that the probative value of these conversations was significant, particularly in light of their proximity to the acts that caused the death of the deceased. The court also considered the relevance of the relationship between the two accused in relation to the joint criminal enterprise. The court concluded that the illegally obtained evidence should be admitted because of its significant probative value. Furthermore, the court held that there was no appreciable prejudice to Bloodsworth arising from her request for "crack" cocaine because there was already substantial evidence of her drug addiction and the conduct of Errington in supplying her with drugs.

The court also considered the applicability of the Surveillance Devices Act (NSW) and found that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) covered the field of telephone interception, and therefore the application within a telephone which records telephone calls from that device constitutes an interception within the meaning of the Commonwealth Act. The court held that there was no room for the operation of the Surveillance Devices Act (NSW) in this case. The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions of both respondents were upheld.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and the convictions of both respondents be upheld. The court found that the evidence obtained through the illegal interception of telephone conversations was admissible despite the illegality of its procurement, and that there was no appreciable prejudice to Bloodsworth arising from her request for "crack" cocaine. The court also held that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) covered the field of telephone interception and that there was no room for the operation of the Surveillance Devices Act (NSW) in this case.