R v Amjad

The appeal concerned convictions for rape and indecent assault. The appellant, R v Amjad, challenged the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the use of complaints made by the complainant, the handling of inconsistencies between those complaints and trial evidence, and the special arrangements made for the complainant's evidence. The appellant also raised issues concerning the assessment of expert evidence and the element of consent in the indecent assault charge. The central question before the appellate court was whether these alleged errors, individually or cumulatively, resulted in a miscarriage of justice, rendering the verdicts unsafe and unsatisfactory.

The court was required to determine several legal issues. Firstly, whether the trial judge's directions on the use of complaints by the complainant allowed the jury to treat them as evidence of the facts, rather than for corroborative purposes. Secondly, whether the judge adequately addressed inconsistencies between the complainant's prior complaints and her evidence at trial. Thirdly, the court considered whether the judge erred by failing to warn the jury against drawing adverse inferences from special arrangements made for the complainant's evidence. Finally, the court examined whether the judge provided sufficient guidance on assessing expert evidence and adequately directed the jury on the element of consent for the indecent assault offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial. The court found that the trial judge's comments on the use of complaints could have led the jury to treat them as evidence of the facts, which was an error. While inconsistencies between complaints and trial evidence were of limited significance and the judge was not bound to canvass them extensively, the primary error lay in the directions concerning the use of complaints, as the complainant's credibility was fundamental to the case. Furthermore, the judge erred in failing to provide a required direction under section 13(7) of the Evidence Act 1929 concerning the special arrangements for the complainant's evidence, as the complainant was not a child. Although the judge later sufficiently canvassed the element of consent for the indecent assault, and the handling of expert evidence did not occasion a miscarriage of justice, the cumulative effect of the errors, particularly regarding the use of prior complaints and the failure to give the section 13(7) direction, meant the appellant had lost a chance of acquittal that was fairly open to him.