Printing Industry Employees Union of Australia v Victorian Chamber of Manufactures

The parties to this matter were the Printing Industry Employees Union of Australia and the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, along with other respondents. The dispute concerned the procedure for hearing claims before the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, specifically whether claims for reduced standard hours of work and claims for an increased basic wage should be heard concurrently or separately. The Full Court of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had initially directed a concurrent hearing, but one of the claimant unions sought a separate hearing for the standard hours claims. The Acting Chief Judge asserted his sole authority under section 43(2) of the *Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1946* to determine procedural matters, while the other two judges believed this power resided with the Full Court. This disagreement led to a summons being issued to the High Court of Australia under section 21AA of the Act to determine the question of legal authority.

The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. Firstly, whether the question of whether the application for separate hearings was a matter to be decided exclusively by the Acting Chief Judge, or by the Full Court as a whole, constituted a "question of law arising in relation to" proceedings before the Full Court, as contemplated by section 21AA of the Act. Secondly, and more substantively, the Court had to determine whether the power to decide whether the standard hours claims and basic wage claims should be heard concurrently or separately rested solely with the Acting Chief Judge under section 43(2) of the Act, or if it was a matter for determination by all or a majority of the members of the Full Court.

The High Court held, by a majority, that the question of who had the authority to determine the procedural question of concurrent versus separate hearings was indeed a question of law arising in relation to the proceedings before the Full Court. The Court reasoned that section 43(2) of the Act, which grants the Chief Judge power to direct practice and procedure, is subject to the rest of the Act. Sections 38 and 18A(3) of the Act confer broad powers on the Court itself to hear and determine disputes and to give necessary directions, including the power to regulate the order of hearings. Therefore, the power to decide whether claims should be heard together or separately was a function of the Full Court, not a power exercisable solely by the Acting Chief Judge. The Court concluded that the application for separate hearings was a matter to be determined by all or a majority of the members of the Full Court.