Polson and Polson

In the matter of *Polson and Polson*, Hogan J of the Supreme Court of Tasmania was required to determine an oral application made by counsel for the applicant seeking the recusal of the trial judge from further conduct of the trial.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether there were grounds for the trial judge to disqualify herself from continuing to preside over the proceedings. This involved an assessment of whether the judge’s impartiality could reasonably be apprehended by a fair-minded lay observer.

Hogan J dismissed the application, finding that no sufficient grounds existed to warrant recusal. The reasoning applied focused on the principles of judicial impartiality and the high threshold required to establish apprehended bias. The Court concluded that the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge would not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the issues before her.

The application for the trial judge to recuse herself was dismissed.