Plenty v Dillon

The application before the High Court of Australia concerned Michael Kenneth Dillon, Robert Raymond Jennings, and the State of South Australia. The core of the dispute revolved around the right of officialdom to enter private property, specifically in the context of police powers. The applicant sought special leave to appeal a decision, with the proceedings being heard in Adelaide.

The legal issues before the Court centred on the extent to which official bodies, particularly the police, have a right to enter private property. This involved considering the concept of an implied licence to enter, and how that might be affected by the actions of the property owner. The applicant argued that this case presented a fundamental question regarding the liberty of the subject and the right of individuals to prevent entry onto their land.

The applicant's submissions drew a distinction between the present case and the High Court's previous decision in *Halliday v Nevill*. In *Halliday v Nevill*, the Court had considered the implied licence that generally permits individuals, including police officers, to enter private property for ordinary purposes. However, the applicant contended that in this instance, any implied licence had been expressly excluded by the applicant's prior communications with authorities. The applicant sought to argue that the principles discussed in *Halliday v Nevill*, particularly concerning the fundamental importance of the liberty of the subject, were applicable here, but that the specific facts, including the express exclusion of any licence, differentiated it from the earlier case.