Plenty v Dillon

The case of *Plenty v Dillon* was heard in the High Court of Australia, with Michael Kenneth Dillon as the appellant and Robert Raymond Jennings and the State of South Australia as the respondents. The dispute concerned the legality of entering private property against the will of the occupier for the sole purpose of serving a summons. The appellant argued that such an entry constituted trespass at common law.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether, at common law, there existed a power to enter private property without consent for the purpose of serving a summons. The appellant contended that no such power existed and that any statutory power to enter for service should not exceed common law rights. A key aspect of the appellant's argument involved distinguishing between the "service" of legal process and its "execution," asserting that the former did not grant a right of entry against the will of the occupier.

The appellant argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in finding that no trespass had occurred. The facts indicated that on 5 December 1978, the respondents attempted to enter the appellant's land to serve a summons on his 14-year-old daughter and a notice on the appellant and his wife, pursuant to section 29 of the Juvenile Courts Act. The appellant maintained that any implied licence to enter the property had been withdrawn, and that the act of serving a summons, as opposed to executing a warrant or writ, did not justify entry without permission. The appellant's submission was that the distinction between service and execution was significant and supported by legislation such as the Service and Execution of Process Act.