Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd

In an action for negligence arising from a street accident, Albert Bathurst Piddington (the appellant) sued Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (the respondent) for damages after being struck by a motor cycle driven by the respondent's employee. The appellant alleged negligence in the operation of the motor cycle. A key witness for the appellant, Donnellan, testified to witnessing the accident and explained his presence at the scene by stating he had been running an errand for a Major Jarvie at a bank. The respondent called the bank manager, who produced records indicating no transactions on Jarvie's account on the day of the accident, and testified that Donnellan had not conducted any banking operations for Jarvie. This evidence was admitted over objection, and the jury returned a verdict for the respondent. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused the appellant's application for a new trial, with one judge dissenting. The appellant appealed to the High Court.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the bank manager's evidence was admissible, and if not, whether its admission constituted an error that reasonably could have influenced the jury's verdict, thereby necessitating a new trial. Specifically, the court had to determine if the evidence, which contradicted the witness Donnellan's explanation for his presence at the scene, was relevant to the facts in issue or merely collateral to Donnellan's general credit, and if it fell within any exceptions to the rule against contradicting evidence on collateral matters.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Dixon, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ., held that the bank manager's evidence was inadmissible. They reasoned that while evidence of a witness's presence and opportunity to observe is relevant to the facts in issue, the bank manager's testimony did not directly disprove Donnellan's presence at the scene of the accident. Instead, it merely contradicted a collateral explanation for his presence, and such evidence is generally inadmissible if it goes only to the witness's credit. The majority found that the misreception of this evidence could not be dismissed as an immaterial error, as it was reasonably capable of affecting the jury's verdict by undermining the credibility of a crucial witness. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered. Latham C.J. and Starke J. dissented, finding the evidence admissible as it tended to disprove the explanation for Donnellan's presence, and that even if inadmissible, it was of little weight and unlikely to have prejudiced the appellant.