Phillips v The Queen

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal by Phillips against his convictions for sexual offences. The case involved eight counts on an indictment, stemming from allegations made by six complainants. The central dispute concerned the joinder of these counts and the admissibility of evidence relating to each complainant in relation to all counts, particularly in light of the appellant's defence.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the admission of evidence from each complainant in relation to all counts was so prejudicial to the appellant that separate trials should have been ordered. The Court was also required to determine the admissibility of similar fact evidence, specifically whether evidence relating to one complainant could be admitted in relation to counts involving other complainants, and whether such evidence was admissible on the issue of consent or other issues, applying the principles established in *Pfennig v The Queen*. Furthermore, the Court considered whether the verdicts were unreasonable, potentially being the product of jury compromise, and whether a retrial on certain counts would be affected by a prior acquittal on another count.

The High Court reasoned that the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the use of similar fact evidence were inadequate to overcome the substantial prejudice to the appellant. The judge had limited the use of this evidence to the issue of consent, but the complexity of the charges and the number of complainants made it highly probable that the jury would use the evidence to infer guilt across all counts, rather than solely on the specific issues permitted. The Court reiterated the stringent common law requirement for similar fact evidence to possess a strong degree of probative force, a threshold not met in this case. The Court found that the joinder of counts and the admission of evidence relating to all complainants in a single trial created an unacceptable risk of unfairness, contrary to the principles of a fair trial and the requirements of decisions like *Pfennig*.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions for counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and ordered separate retrials on each of these counts. The Court also clarified that the acquittal on one count of rape did not preclude the admission of relevant evidence on retrial for other counts, provided appropriate directions were given to the jury.