Perry v Perry (No 2)

The case of Perry v Perry (No 2) involved the parties, Mr. and Mrs. Perry, who were engaged in a financial dispute. The matter came before the court to resolve issues relating to the distribution of their matrimonial assets, and to address a specific offer of compromise made by Mr. Perry, referred to as a Calderbank offer. The court was tasked with determining whether it was unreasonable for Mrs. Perry to reject this offer, and consequently, whether the general rule that costs follow the event should be departed from in this instance.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the rejection of a Calderbank offer constituted an unreasonable course of action, warranting a departure from the general principle that costs follow the event. Additionally, the court needed to decide if the costs incurred by both parties should be apportioned between different issues, given that there had been mixed success in their respective claims.

In delivering its judgment, the court noted that a Calderbank offer is a significant tool in encouraging parties to settle disputes without proceeding to trial. However, the court emphasised that the reasonableness of rejecting such an offer must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The court found that, in this instance, Mrs. Perry's decision to reject the offer was not unreasonable, given the circumstances. Consequently, the court concluded that the general rule that costs follow the event should not be departed from, and both parties were to bear their own costs, except in respect of one specific issue. This decision was grounded in the court's assessment that the rejection of the Calderbank offer was not unreasonable, and that the parties should not be penalised for their respective positions.

The court's final orders were that the parties were to bear their own costs, save for in respect of one particular issue where a different apportionment was made. This decision highlighted the importance of assessing the reasonableness of rejecting a Calderbank offer and the court's reluctance to depart from the general rule regarding the allocation of costs.