Pappas and Ebner

In *Pappas & Ebner*, the Family Court of Australia considered an application by the husband, Mr Ebner, to vary consent orders made on 25 October 2012 pursuant to section 79A of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth). The wife, Ms Pappas, sought summary dismissal of the husband's application. The dispute centred on allegations by the husband that the wife had failed to disclose relevant information regarding a share portfolio and had wrongly attributed a nil value to her interest in a business.

The court was required to determine whether the husband's application under section 79A(1)(a) of the *Family Law Act*, alleging a miscarriage of justice due to suppression of evidence or failure to disclose relevant information, had a reasonable prospect of success. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the husband had demonstrated that the wife's alleged non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, given that the husband was aware of the existence of the share portfolio and the valuation of the business at the time the consent orders were made.

Justice Stevenson applied the principles for summary dismissal as outlined in *Lindon v Commonwealth* and *Friar & Friar*, which require the applicant for summary relief to demonstrate that the opponent's claim is clearly frivolous or vexatious, or has no reasonable likelihood of success. The court found that the husband had sufficient knowledge of the wife's share portfolio and the valuation of her business interests prior to the consent orders being made. Evidence, including the husband's own affidavits and annexed documents, indicated he was aware of the share portfolio and the H Firm indemnity, and had access to a report valuing the business. Therefore, the court concluded that the husband could not establish a miscarriage of justice for the purposes of section 79A(1)(a) based on the alleged non-disclosure.

Consequently, the court ordered the summary dismissal of the husband's application pursuant to section 79A and his related application for costs arising during 2012, finding that he lacked a reasonable cause of action and that his claim was clearly frivolous or vexatious.