Papoutsakis v Dunn

In *Papoutsakis v Dunn*, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales considered an application to dismiss an appeal as incompetent. The plaintiff, an undischarged bankrupt, had their statement of claim dismissed by the primary judge on the grounds that they lacked the standing to sue, pursuant to section 58 of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth). The plaintiff sought to appeal this decision.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the proceedings fell within an exception to the general rule of bankruptcy affecting standing, specifically under section 116(2)(g) of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth), and whether the matter for determination on appeal constituted a matter arising under an Act referred to in Schedule 1 of the *Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987* (NSW), thereby conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal.

Gleeson JA reasoned that the primary judge's decision concerned the plaintiff's standing to sue, which was a question of general law and not a matter arising under a specific federal Act listed in the Schedule to the *Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987* (NSW). Consequently, the Court of Appeal lacked the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Court also considered the application for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the notice of appeal be dismissed as incompetent and that the appellant pay the respondents’ costs in the Court of Appeal on and from 23 September 2024. The summons seeking leave to appeal was also dismissed, with each party to bear their own costs of that summons.