Palmer v Australian Electoral Commission

In *Palmer v Australian Electoral Commission*, the High Court of Australia considered a challenge brought by Clive Palmer and others against the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The dispute concerned the AEC's practice of publishing information about the indicative two-candidate preferred count for a Division after the close of polls in that Division, even when polls remained open in other parts of the nation. The plaintiffs alleged this practice was unlawful and contrary to the Constitution.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the AEC's publication of indicative two-candidate preferred count information prior to the close of polls nationally was authorised by section 7(3) of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Cth), and whether such publication was contrary to sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution. The plaintiffs contended that the publication was inaccurate, misleading, conferred an imprimatur on particular candidates, and had a demonstrable effect on electoral choices, thereby undermining the constitutional requirement for a "direct and popular choice" of the House of Representatives.

The High Court dismissed the application. The Court found that the AEC's publication of the indicative two-candidate preferred count was a lawful exercise of its power under section 7(3) of the Act, which permits the AEC to do all things necessary or convenient for the performance of its functions. The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a factual foundation for their claims that the publication was inaccurate, misleading, or had any demonstrable effect on electoral choices. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the publication did not constitute an imprimatur or demonstrate partiality, nor was it contrary to the constitutional principles of a direct and popular choice.

The application was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendants' costs.