NPXL and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

This matter concerned an application for an extension of time to seek a second review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) of a decision made by the Secretary, Department of Social Services. The dispute arose from the recalculation of a debt owed by the applicant, NPXL, relating to an overpayment of Newstart Allowance and Sickness Allowance. The AAT, presided over by Senior Member Chris Puplick AM, was required to determine whether to grant an extension of time for the second review application.

The central legal issue before the Tribunal was the scope of its jurisdiction under section 179 of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999* (Cth) when a previous AAT decision had set aside a decision and remitted the matter to the Secretary for reconsideration in accordance with directions or recommendations. Specifically, the Tribunal had to consider whether it could review aspects of the debt calculation and potential waiver, or if its review was confined solely to the directions or recommendations made by the AAT in its first review decision. This involved interpreting section 179(2)(d) of the Act and considering how it applied to the specific circumstances of the case, drawing on previous AAT decisions.

The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the interpretation of section 179(2)(d) of the *Social Security (Administration) Act 1999*. Drawing on authorities such as *Owen*, *Davey*, *Aslanidis*, and *Pearson*, the Tribunal concluded that where a first review decision by the AAT (or its predecessor, the SSAT) sets aside a decision and remits the matter to the Secretary for reconsideration with directions or recommendations, the AAT's jurisdiction on a second review is limited to reviewing those specific directions or recommendations. The Tribunal held that it could not review the merits of the original decision regarding overpayments, the raising of debts, or the waiver of those debts, as these matters were not encompassed by the directions or recommendations made in the first review.

Consequently, the Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the substantive issues raised by the applicant concerning the recalculation of the debt and its potential waiver. As the application for an extension of time was predicated on the Tribunal having jurisdiction to hear the substantive merits of the case, and given the jurisdictional limitations identified, the application for an extension of time was refused.