Northern Land Council v Quall

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Northern Land Council (NLC) and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute concerned the validity of a certificate issued by the CEO, purportedly on behalf of the NLC, certifying an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) application. The NLC, as a representative Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander body, has a statutory function under the *Native Title Act 1993* (Cth) to certify such applications, provided it is satisfied that all reasonable efforts have been made to identify and obtain authorisation from all persons who hold or may hold native title. The central issue was whether this certification function, conferred by s 203BE(1)(b) of the *Native Title Act*, could be delegated by the NLC to its CEO.

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold: first, whether the certification function under s 203BE(1)(b) of the *Native Title Act* was capable of delegation by the NLC to its CEO; and second, whether the CEO could validly perform this function as an agent of the NLC. The NLC contended that its general power under s 27(1) of the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* (Cth) to do all things necessary or convenient for the performance of its functions included the power to delegate the certification function. The respondents argued that the certification function was a personal one that could not be delegated.

The High Court held that the NLC possessed the power to delegate the certification function to its CEO under s 27(1) of the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act*. The Court reasoned that if such a delegation occurred, the CEO, acting as a delegate, could perform the function based on their own opinion regarding the identification and authorisation requirements, as permitted by s 34A of the *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth). Furthermore, by operation of s 34AB(1)(c) of the *Acts Interpretation Act*, any performance of the function by the CEO as a delegate would be deemed to have been performed by the NLC itself for the purposes of both the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act* and the *Native Title Act*. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the declaration and orders of the Full Court were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Full Court to determine whether the certification function had, in fact, been duly delegated.