Niem and Tong

In this matter before Foster J, the husband sought the disqualification of the judicial officer on the grounds of apprehended bias. The dispute concerned the husband's assertion that the judge had prejudged the case, thereby necessitating recusal.

The central legal issue before the court was to determine whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions before them. This required the court to consider the established principles governing apprehended bias, as articulated in cases such as *Johnson v Johnson* and *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy*.

Foster J applied the well-settled test for apprehended bias, which focuses on the objective standard of a reasonable lay observer. The court noted that judges are expected to engage with the proceedings, form tentative views, and participate in a dialogue with counsel, and that such engagement does not, in itself, indicate prejudgment. The principles from *Johnson v Johnson* were reiterated, emphasizing that the test is not based on the judge's subjective belief but on public confidence in the administration of justice, requiring that justice be both done and seen to be done. The court also considered the principle that judges do not select their cases and that objections to a judge sitting must be based on substantial grounds, as an insubstantial objection should not allow parties to influence the composition of the bench.

The husband's application for disqualification was dismissed.