Nickells v Melbourne Corporation

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appellants, Donna Nickells and Doris Irene Richards, trading as "Le Rae," had sued the Mayor, Aldermen, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne for damages resulting from a collision between a horse-drawn garbage cart and their shop window. The County Court had found the municipality negligent and awarded damages, but the Supreme Court ordered a new trial, finding the County Court judge's reasoning insufficient.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the act of driving a wide horse-drawn cart into a narrow lane, flanked by shop windows, constituted sufficient evidence of negligence, even if the driver exercised care in managing the horse and cart. Specifically, the court had to determine if the circumstances of the lane's width, the cart's size, and the proximity to glass shop fronts created an inherent risk that amounted to negligence, irrespective of the immediate cause of the horse becoming startled.

A majority of the High Court (Latham C.J., Dixon, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ.) held that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of negligence. Their reasoning focused on the principle that while using a highway is a right, it must be exercised reasonably according to the character of the way. Driving a vehicle so large that it left minimal clearance to shop windows in a narrow lane, particularly when turning, was considered an unreasonable introduction of risk. The judges reasoned that the driver was bound not to cut the margin of safety so fine that an accident was almost inevitable if something untoward occurred, such as a horse becoming startled. The fact that the cart was lawfully in the lane did not absolve the driver from the duty to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances, which included considering the potential for damage to adjoining property due to the narrowness of the lane and the size of the vehicle.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Supreme Court and restoring the judgment of the County Court. The respondent municipality was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the High Court and the costs of the appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court.