Neil v Lee (No. 2)

Neil v Lee (No. 2) involves an application by the Applicant, who was the Complainant in the original matter, to reopen proceedings for an order to de-identify her name and prohibit its publication. The application was made under the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act) and the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (AD Act). The original judgment, which included the Applicant's name, had been published on the Supreme Court Library website. The Applicant sought to have her name removed from the published judgment and to prohibit further publication of her name as the Complainant. The court was required to decide whether the proceedings should be reopened, and if so, whether the Applicant's name should be de-identified and publication prohibited.

The court considered the principles governing the reopening of proceedings under s 484 of the IR Act, as well as the principles about de-identifying a party's name and prohibiting publication of a party's name. The court noted that the open justice principle, which requires that justice should be seen to be done, is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice. However, this principle is not absolute and there are statutory exceptions that permit the withholding of names. The court also considered the power of the Commission to modify previously published decisions and make anonymity and non-publication orders under s 451(2)(c) of the IR Act and s 191 of the AD Act. The court concluded that the application to withhold the names of the two workers could be explained on the basis that in the absence of a restriction on publicity, damage will be caused to the individuals to such an extent and of such a kind as requiring some relief, in the interests of justice.

The court dismissed the application to reopen the proceedings and make the orders sought. The court found that the principles of open justice, while important, were not absolute and there were circumstances in which the names of parties could be withheld. However, in this case, the court was not satisfied that the Applicant had demonstrated that the publication of her name would cause her damage to such an extent and of such a kind as requiring some relief, in the interests of justice. The court also noted that the original judgment had already been published and that it would not be appropriate to modify it retrospectively.

Orders:
The application to reopen the proceedings and make the orders sought is dismissed.