FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NAHY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCA 644NAHY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
N 506 OF 2003GYLES J
SYDNEY
20 MAY 2003
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 506 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
NAHY
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 MAY 2003
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 506 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
NAHY
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE:
20 MAY 2003
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application to extend time for filing a notice of appeal from the judgment of Madgwick J, given on 21 March 2003. Granting of such an extension of time involves essentially two things. The first is to explain the delay and the second is to show that there is some proper basis for appeal. As to the first, the applicant, who is and was unrepresented, explains that he thought that the time for an appeal would run from the supply of the written reasons for the ex tempore judgment given on 21 March, those reasons not being obtained until 8 April 2003. That, together with some possible medical problems, would probably suffice to explain the delay sufficiently.
However, as to the second, in submissions filed prior to the hearing of this application the solicitor for the Minister has submitted that in substance there is plainly no basis for the appeal and that it would be futile to grant the extension of time sought. In my opinion this submission is correct. The draft notice of appeal which is proposed to be filed states the following ground:
‘I am not satisfied with decision from the Federal Court of Australia which admits mistakes in the Refugee Review Tribunal but stop short to recommend of the decision.’
That does not of course set out any proper ground of appeal. When I go back to the original application to the Court and the supporting affidavit, I find that the details of the claim indicate that the applicant was critical of the state of knowledge of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) concerning current conditions in the Ukraine. Before me today he repeats that as being the nub of his complaint. He says that he can obtain material which would demonstrate this and he would like more time to get this material together and obtain a lawyer to put his case.
The applicant arrived in Australia in August 2000. The Tribunal decision was dated 19 December 2002 and the proceeding in this Court was heard and decided by Madgwick J on 21 March 2003. There has been ample time for the applicant to organise what he wishes to organise in the lengthy period during which the matter was considered by first the Minister’s Department then the Tribunal and then a Judge of this Court.
Fundamentally, however, even if factual material might be obtained it would not go to any ground of appeal that has been isolated or identified from the judgment of Madgwick J. I should also indicate that I have read the judgment of Madgwick J and, bearing in mind the inability of the applicant to properly raise any ground of review, it seems to me that his Honour bent over backwards to consider the applicant’s case and obviously carefully considered the decision of the Tribunal to see whether his Honour could isolate any reviewable error.
Despite this, his Honour was unable to do so. I have also read the Tribunal’s decision, not with a view to going through it with a fine tooth comb to see if there is any error, but to ensure that there was no obvious error which had been overlooked by Madgwick J and which could conceivably form the basis of an appeal. I was unable to identify any such error. In those circumstances, in my opinion, to grant an extension of time to lodge a notice of appeal would be to set in train a futile appeal with all of the costs and distraction it occasions to both the Court and the Minister. In my opinion, the application must be and is dismissed.
The solicitor for the Minister has sought an order for costs. I order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.
I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles. Associate:
Dated: 25 June 2003
The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Blake Dawson Waldron Date of Hearing: 20 May 2003 Date of Judgment: 20 May 2003
- AGLC
- NAHY v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 644
- Case
- [2003] FCA 644
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the decision to cancel the visa was lawful and if the respondent's consideration of the applicant's criminal convictions was justified under the Act. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the decision-maker adequately considered the relevant factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offences, and whether the decision was unreasonable or based on an error of law.
The court examined the decision-making process and found that the decision-maker had appropriately considered the statutory criteria and relevant factors, including the seriousness of the crimes, the time elapsed since the convictions, and the applicant's personal circumstances. The court held that the decision was lawful and not based on an error of law. It concluded that the decision to cancel the visa was reasonable and thus dismissed the application. The court also ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GYLES J
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