Murphy Operator v Gladstone Ports Corporation (No 9)

The case of Murphy Operator v Gladstone Ports Corporation (No 9) involved the plaintiffs seeking leave to amend the further amended statement of claim in a class action proceeding. The plaintiffs sought to include new causes of action in a proposed second further amended statement of claim, some of which had expired under the statute of limitations. The legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend the further amended statement of claim to include these new causes of action, and if the court should consider the proper construction of sections 103Z and 103ZA of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld). The court also had to decide whether it was necessary to comply with rule 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) due to the suspension of the limitation period in section 103Z of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), and whether group members could obtain broader time limitation relief than what was available to representative parties.

The court found that the plaintiffs were seeking to include new causes of action which had expired under the statute of limitations, and thus, they ought not to be granted leave to amend the further amended statement of claim to include these new causes of action. The court held that the proper construction of sections 103Z and 103ZA of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) did not permit the plaintiffs to include new causes of action that had expired under the statute of limitations. The court further found that it was necessary to comply with rule 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) due to the suspension of the limitation period in section 103Z of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), and that group members could not obtain broader time limitation relief than what was available to representative parties.

The court ordered that the parties were to provide minutes of orders consistent with these reasons. The court also noted that evidence and pleadings should not be confused, and that the critical rules of pleading required the plaintiffs to plead and sufficiently particularise the material facts without pleading the evidence. The court held that the plaintiffs had not complied with these rules, and that the provision of particulars by reference to evidence, in particular, expert evidence, was not permissible.