Munday v Gill

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned the convictions of nineteen individuals for offences related to unlawful assembly under section 545c of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), as inserted by the Crimes (Intimidation and Molestation) Act 1929 (NSW). The core of the dispute arose from the Police Magistrate's decision to hear twenty separate informations against these individuals together, a practice referred to as "lumping" the cases.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the Police Magistrate had the jurisdiction to hear multiple separate informations against different defendants simultaneously, even with the consent of the defendants' counsel. The Court was also required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence presented to establish the unlawfulness of the assembly and whether the defendants had knowingly continued in such an assembly. Furthermore, the admissibility of certain evidence and the proper grounds for statutory prohibition were examined.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Gavan Duffy, Rich, Starke, and Dixon JJ., held that the Supreme Court was correct in quashing the convictions. The Court reasoned that the principle established in cases like *Crane v. Director of Public Prosecutions* and *R. v. Dennis*, which prohibits the joint trial of separate informations against different defendants, applied equally to summary jurisdiction proceedings before a magistrate. The Court found that the magistrate's act of hearing the cases together, despite the defendants' initial objection and subsequent consent, constituted a fundamental lack of jurisdiction, rendering the convictions void. This was not a mere irregularity that could be waived, but a vitiation of the entire proceeding, meaning the magistrate had not lawfully determined the guilt or innocence of each individual.

The High Court allowed the appeal, overturning the Supreme Court's decision. The majority found that the magistrate had jurisdiction to hear the cases together, even though it was an irregularity. They reasoned that the defendants, through their counsel, had consented to the joint hearing, thereby waiving any objection to the procedure. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that an unlawful assembly had occurred and that the defendants had knowingly continued in it. Consequently, the convictions were upheld.