Moylan v Nutrasweet Co

The case of *Moylan v Nutrasweet Co* involved nine plaintiffs who brought personal injury claims against the defendants concerning the use of an intrauterine device. The dispute centred on whether the use of the device caused the plaintiffs to contract Pelvic Inflammatory Disease (PID), leading to infertility and ectopic pregnancies, and whether the defendants had acted in knowing disregard of the plaintiffs' health and welfare, thus entitling them to exemplary damages. The matter came before the Court of Appeal after a judgment by Bruce J.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine several key issues. Firstly, it had to consider the adequacy of the reasons provided by Bruce J in his judgment, particularly given the extensive length of the judgment and its heavy reliance on the parties' submissions, as well as the delay in its delivery. Secondly, the Court had to address the exercise of discretion under section 60G of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW) regarding the extension of limitation periods for the plaintiffs' causes of action, including the onus of proof and whether it was "just and reasonable" to grant such extensions. Finally, the Court had to decide on the appropriate orders regarding the costs of the appeals and the new trials.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals against the judgment and orders of Bruce J in the liability proceedings and set aside those judgments and orders, ordering new trials in each of the nine actions. Similarly, the appeals against the orders extending the limitation periods were allowed, the orders were set aside, and new trials were ordered for the applications to extend those periods. The Court imposed no conditions or directions on the conduct of the new trials. The Court also made specific orders regarding the costs of the appeals, with the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' costs of the liability appeal on certain grounds, and the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs of the limitation appeals. The costs of the new liability and limitation proceedings were left to the discretion of the judges who would hear those matters.