Moss v Council of the City of Ryde

Case [2018] NSWLEC 1217


Land and Environment Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Moss v Council of the City of Ryde [2018] NSWLEC 1217
Hearing dates: Conciliation conference on 11 & 27 April 2018
Date of orders: 07 May 2018
Decision date: 07 May 2018
Jurisdiction:Class 1
Before: Bish C
Decision:

See [4] below

Catchwords: DEVELOPMENT APPLICATION: conciliation conference; agreement between the parties; orders
Legislation Cited: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
Land and Environment Court Act 1979
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Bill Moss (Applicant)
Council of the City of Ryde (Respondent)
Representation: Solicitor:
G McKee, McKees Legal Solutions (Applicant)
P Kapetas, Council of the City of Ryde (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2017/324365
Publication restriction: No

Judgment

  1. COMMISSIONER: In this matter, at or after a conciliation conference, an agreement under s 34(3) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (the Court Act) was reached between the parties as to the terms of a decision in the proceedings that was acceptable to the parties. As the presiding Commissioner, I was satisfied that the decision was one that the Court could have made in the proper exercise of its functions (this being the test applied by s 34(3) of the Court Act). As a consequence, s 34(3)(a) of the Act required me to “dispose of the proceedings in accordance with the decision”.

  2. The Court Act also required me to “set out in writing the terms of the decision” (s 34(3)(b)). The orders made to give effect to the agreement constitute that document.

  3. In making the orders to give effect to the agreement between the parties, I was not required to make, and have not made, any merit assessment of the issues that were originally in dispute between the parties.

  4. The final orders to give effect to the parties’ agreement under s34(3) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 are:

  1. The Applicant is granted leave to amend its application to rely on the plans detailed in condition 1 of the attached Annexure ‘A’.

  2. The Appeal is upheld.

  3. Pursuant to Section 4.16(3) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, deferred commencement consent is granted to development application No. LDA2017/0358 for the demolition of existing structures on and the subsequent construction of a dwelling house and associated swimming pool at 26 McGowan Street, Putney NSW, subject to the conditions of consent in Annexure ‘A’.

……………………….

Sarah Bish

Commissioner of the Court

Annexure A (372 KB, pdf)

Annexure B (6.35 MB, pdf)

Details
AGLC
Moss v Council of the City of Ryde [2018] NSWLEC 1217
Case
[2018] NSWLEC 1217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Moss v Council of the City of Ryde, the applicant, Moss, sought an injunction and damages against the respondent, the Council of the City of Ryde, for alleged defamatory statements made by the council in its official capacity. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute centred on a series of public statements made by the council regarding the applicant's involvement in a planning dispute, which the applicant claimed were defamatory and caused damage to his reputation.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the statements made by the council were indeed defamatory, and if so, whether they were protected by qualified privilege or fair comment. The court had to consider whether the council's statements were made with a duty to the public to inform, and whether the applicant's reputation was genuinely at stake. The court also needed to assess if the statements were a fair comment on matters of public interest.

In determining the matter, the court examined the content and context of the statements made by the council. It found that the statements were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, as they implied misconduct and dishonesty on the part of the applicant. However, the court also found that the council had a duty to inform the public about the planning dispute, given their role in overseeing the matter. The court concluded that the statements were protected by qualified privilege as they were made with a genuine concern for public interest. Consequently, the applicant's claim for defamation was dismissed. The court further ruled that the applicant had not demonstrated sufficient evidence of special damage to warrant an award of damages.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [4] below

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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