Morrison v Peacock

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal concerning charges of marine pollution. The appellant, Morrison, prosecuted the respondents, Peacock and others, alleging a breach of section 8(1) of the *Marine Pollution Act 1987* (NSW) for discharging oil into State waters from the vessel *Sitka II*. The respondents sought to rely on a defence under section 8(2)(b) of the Act, which provides an exception where oil escapes in consequence of damage to the ship or its equipment, provided all reasonable precautions were taken.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the interpretation of the word "damage" within section 8(2)(b) of the Act, specifically whether the rupture of a hydraulic hose on the vessel's crane, caused by prolonged abrasion and chafing due to corrosion and the hose's movement, constituted "damage" for the purposes of the defence. The respondents argued that the hose rupture was damage to the ship's equipment, leading to the oil escape, and that this damage was not intentional.

The High Court determined that the question reserved by the lower court did not accurately reflect the factual dispute. The true issue was whether the specific circumstances of the hose rupture, resulting from wear and tear over time due to chafing against a corroded sleeve, fell within the meaning of "damage" as contemplated by the Act. The Court reasoned that "damage" in this context refers to a sudden change in the condition of the ship or its equipment, caused by an instantaneous event, rather than a gradual deterioration. Therefore, the prolonged abrasion and chafing leading to the hose rupture did not constitute "damage" in the sense required for the statutory defence.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court answered the reserved question (i)(a) by stating that "damage" in section 8 means a sudden change in the condition of the ship or its equipment that was the instantaneous consequence of some event. The Court found the question otherwise inappropriate to answer in light of its interpretation.