FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Merrill Lynch (Aust) Pty Ltd v Johnson Taylor Potter Ltd [2001] FCA 241
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – ex parte injunction against former employees of stockbroker – whether injunction should be discharged – balance of
MERRILL LYNCH (AUST) PTY LTD & ORS v JOHNSON TAYLOR POTTER LTD & ORS
N 128 OF 2001HEEREY J
16 FEBRUARY 2001
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 128 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
MERRILL LYNCH (AUST) PTY LTD AND OTHERS
(ACN 006 390 772)
APPLICANTAND:
JOHNSON TAYLOR POTTER LTD AND OTHERS
(ACN 006 390 772)
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
HEEREY J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 FEBRUARY 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The injunction granted on 14 February 2001 is discharged.
2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application for an interlocutory injunction.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 128 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
MERRILL LYNCH (AUST) PTY LTD AND OTHERS
(ACN 006 390 772)
APPLICANTAND:
JOHNSON TAYLOR POTTER LTD AND OTHERS
(ACN 006 390 772)
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
HEEREY J
DATE:
16 FEBRUARY 2001
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
I need not trouble counsel for the respondents. I am satisfied that this injunction should be discharged. There does appear to be a serious issue to be tried, namely whether the general rules against employees taking away from an employer matters such as lists of clients is modified or even abrogated by what the evidence suggests is a practice within the broking industry in Australia, or at any rate in Melbourne. The suggested practice is that employee brokers move from firm to firm and their clients follow them and are regarded as clients of them rather than the employer. Whether that argument is a strong one is not for me to say at the moment, but there is evidence in support of it.
As to the two particular respondents, Mr Cody and Mr White, the evidence that they themselves took detailed lists which were generated by Merrill Lynch themselves, as distinct from their own notes which they had previously, seems somewhat equivocal at the moment.
But the most important consideration in my mind in discharging the injunction is the question of the balance of convenience. If an injunction were to be granted, it would have a very serious effect on the capacity of Mr Cody and Mr White to carry on a profession in which they have been engaged for some ten years or more. Even in its modified form the injunction, as proposed, would prohibit them from using knowledge, such as, for example, client names which they might have in their heads, quite unrelated to any documentary record at all, whether personal ones or ones generated by Merrill Lynch.
On the other hand, I am not satisfied that Merrill Lynch would suffer irreparable loss if the injunction were discharged but they were able to make out their case at trial. It would seem to be not impossible to identify Merrill Lynch clients who went across to Johnson Taylor Potter with Messrs Cody and White and what profits Merrill Lynch might have made from those clients. So, in other words, damages or an account of profits would be an adequate remedy. Further, Merrill Lynch is a very substantial organisation, with assets under management of some US$1.5 trillion. It should be able to compete in the marketplace and persuade its clients that they are better off staying with Merrill Lynch than going to Johnson Taylor Potter.
In any event, the material suggests that Merrill Lynch are taking a direction in which they are not so interested in the type of private client business that Messrs Cody and White were engaged in. So for those reasons the injunction will be discharged. The applicant must pay the respondents’ costs.
I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Heerey. Associate:
Dated: 16 February 2001
Counsel for the Applicant: W T Houghton QC and A J Maryniak Solicitors for the Applicant: Freehills Counsel for the first Respondent: R C Macaw QC and A K Panna Solicitors for the first Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the second and third Respondents: J D Elliott Solicitors for the second and third Respondents: Tolhurst Bruce and Emmerson Date of Hearing: 16 February 2001 Date of Judgment: 16 February 2001
- AGLC
- Merrill Lynch (Aust) Pty Ltd v Johnson Taylor Potter Ltd [2001] FCA 241
- Case
- [2001] FCA 241
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues were whether the confidential information was indeed confidential, whether there had been a breach of confidence, and if an interlocutory injunction was warranted to prevent further alleged misuse. The court had to consider the nature of the information, the existence of a duty of confidence, and the balance of convenience in determining the appropriateness of the injunction.
The court found that the information in question was not as confidential as claimed and that there was no evidence of actual or threatened misuse of that information. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of a serious issue to be tried. Additionally, the court ruled that the balance of convenience favoured the discharge of the injunction. Consequently, the injunction was discharged, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application for an interlocutory injunction.
The court's final orders were to discharge the injunction granted on 14 February 2001 and to require the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the application for an interlocutory injunction. This decision underscored the importance of establishing the confidentiality of information and the necessity for a strong case to support the grant of an interlocutory injunction.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The injunction granted on 14 February 2001 is discharged.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application for an interlocutory injunction.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: HEEREY J
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