Mellifont v Attorney-General of Queensland

This matter came before the High Court of Australia concerning an application for special leave to appeal by Terrence Joseph Mellifont against the Attorney-General of Queensland. The core of the dispute revolved around the nature of a decision made by the Court of Criminal Appeal of Queensland under section 669A of the Criminal Code. The Solicitor-General for South Australia and the Solicitor-General for the Northern Territory sought leave to intervene in the proceedings, with South Australia focusing its submissions on the competency of an appeal to the High Court.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the opinion furnished by the Court of Criminal Appeal of Queensland, pursuant to section 669A of the Criminal Code, constituted a "judgment" or "decision" within the meaning of section 73 of the Constitution, thereby attracting the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. This involved determining whether the Court of Criminal Appeal's function under that section was judicial in nature.

Counsel for the Attorney-General of Queensland argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal's opinion was not a judicial decision. This submission was based on the wording of section 669A, which directed the Court to "consider" and "furnish to the Attorney-General its opinion thereon," contrasting this with the language of "hear and determine" found in cases where judicial power was clearly exercised, such as *In re Judiciary and Navigation Act*. Furthermore, it was argued that the provision allowing the acquitted person to be heard "if he so desires" indicated a right to be heard rather than the constitution of a formal legal dispute between parties.