Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners v Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd

The Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners (the Commissioners) appealed from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria concerning land and structures on the River Yarra. The dispute arose when the Commissioners sought to terminate a temporary permission granted to the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. (the company) to occupy and use a wharf and embankment constructed by the company in the bed of the river. The company claimed it had acquired an estate or interest in this area, either through adverse possession or by virtue of its riparian rights, and sought to continue exercising these rights.

The High Court was required to determine whether the company had acquired any estate or interest in the land comprising the bed and shore of the River Yarra, particularly in relation to the wharf and embankment. Specifically, the Court had to consider the effect of the *Land Act 1869* (Vic.) and the *Melbourne Harbour Trust Act 1915* (Vic.) on any such purported acquisition. Furthermore, the Court needed to ascertain whether, upon the termination of the permission, the company retained any right to exercise its riparian rights over the wharf and embankment, even though these structures were vested in the Commissioners.

The majority of the Court, comprising Isaacs and Rich JJ., held that the word "lands" in section 4 of the *Land Act 1869* included the bed and shore of a navigable river. Consequently, a permission or licence not complying with Part III of that Act could not grant an estate or interest in such land. They also found that section 46 of the *Melbourne Harbour Trust Act 1915* vested the bed, soil, and shores of the River Yarra in the Commissioners, free from any interests that might have been acquired under sections 18 and 43 of the *Real Property Act 1915* (Vic.) since 1876. Despite the vesting of the wharf and embankment in the Commissioners, the majority concluded that the company was entitled to use them for the purpose of exercising its riparian rights, subject to the Commissioners' authority, once the permission was terminated. Higgins J., dissenting on this point, maintained that the company's riparian right was limited to access from its land to the river and that it had not acquired any new rights.

The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria was reversed.