Mees v Sherwood Nominees Pty Ltd T/As Wovodich Engineering

Case

[2009] WADC 65

8 MAY 2009


Details
AGLC Case Decision Date
Mees v Sherwood Nominees Pty Ltd T/As Wovodich Engineering [2009] WADC 65 [2009] WADC 65 8 MAY 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Mees, brought an application against Sherwood Nominees Pty Ltd trading as Wovodich Engineering in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The plaintiff sought an extension of time and the setting aside of a judgment in default of compliance with a springing order. The application arose from delays in providing further answers to interrogatories. The dispute hinged on whether the court could extend the time for compliance with a springing order after the specified period had lapsed, given that a formal judgment had already been perfected.

The court had to decide whether it could extend the time for compliance with a springing order, even after the time for compliance had expired, and whether such an extension could be granted in light of a perfected judgment. The defendant argued that the case of FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL should not be applied here because in that case, the judgment had not been perfected. The defendant contended that the Supreme Court Rules only permit an extension of time for a springing order before the formal order has been drawn up and perfected. Furthermore, the defendant claimed that once a formal judgment has been perfected, the court cannot vary it except by appeal or under specific statutory powers, citing commentary in Seaman, Civil Procedure Western Australia.

The court found that the power to extend the time for compliance with a springing order exists under Supreme Court Rules, and this power could be exercised even after the specified time had passed. The court relied on Gaudron J's comments in the FAI case, which suggested that a conditional order does not render the court functus officio and that the court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent injustice. The court concluded that the power to extend the time was not subject to limitations not contained in the grant of that power or discretion, and therefore, the application to extend the time and set aside the judgment was competent. Consequently, the application was successful, and the court set aside the judgment and granted the extension of time.
Details

Areas of Law

  • Civil Litigation & Procedure

Legal Concepts

  • Jurisdiction

  • Limitation Periods

  • Stay of Proceedings

  • Res Judicata