McNamara, Peter v The Queen

Case [1978] FCA 51


i

I

CATCIWORDS

Criminal law

-

Inter locutory appeal

-

Ju r i sd i c t ion of

Federal Court

-

Cr i t e r ion f o r exerc ise - Evidence

implicating co-accused

- Separate t r i a l s - Adjournment

o f t r ia l

-

Federal Court

o f Aus t r a l i a Act

1 9 7 6 (C'th)

S . 24(1) (b) .

PETER McNAMIW v. THE QUEEN

NI-

No.

T N G 5 of 1978

Coram : Brennan, Deane 6 Toohey JJ.

Sydney

22 June

1978 .

I

F /'

. '

CATCHIYORDS

Criminal

law

-

In te r locutory appea l

-

J u r i s d i c t i o n o f

Federal Court

-

C r i t e r i o n for exerc ise

-

Evidence

.

-implicating co-accused

-

S e p a r a t e t r i a l s

-

Adjournment

of t r i a l -

Federal Court

of Aus t r a l i a Act

1976 (C' th)

S , 24(1)

(b) .

PETER ElcNAVARA v. THE QUEEN

NT

No. R'JG 5 of 1978

Coram : Brennan, Deane 6 Toohey JJ.

Sydney

-

22

June

1978.

!

With

great

r e s p e c t , t h e r e f o r e ,

I

submit

t h a t

i t

i s

no t necessa r i ly in imica l t o the in t e re s t s

of

t he admin i s t r a t ion o f j u s t i ce gene ra l ly o r i n

t h e T e r r i t o r y f o r

i t t o be

said

t h a t

h i s iIonour's

discret ion ought not to be reviewed

by

this

cour t

a t t h i s

junc ture .

Thank

you, your Honours.

BFCiXTAN, J:

The court will ad journ

fo r

a short

t ime

and will

CWL/

expec t

t o

resume in

minutes.

ten

'-

UPON R3SUNINS

BREI?NSJ, J: We should have

l iked

soae

t iae

to

fornulate

our

r e a s o n s i n

t h l s mat te r but

the circumstances

make

i t

d e s i r a b l e t h a t

we

give

judgmnt

forthwith.

The

appe l l a t e

j u r i s d i c t i o n o f

t h i s Court

under

s

.24(l)(b)

of

the

Federal Court of Austral ia

-

Act

1976

appea r s t o be s ign i f i can t ly l a rge r t han t he

j u r i s d i c t i o n o r d i n a r i l y c o n f e r r e d i n c r b i n a l m a t t e r s .

A t

first

i n p r e s s i o n , t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n e x t e n c s t o

appeals against inter locutory orders nade

by

a

cour t

of

a

Terr i tory in cr iminal proceedings pending

b e f o r e t h a t c o u r t ,

and

we

were not invited

t o read fhe

s ta tu tory proyis ions

more

narrowly.

Section

24(1)!3)

i n c o n f e r r i n g a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n

on

t h i s

court

does not d i f fe ren t ia te be tween f ina l and in te r -

lccutory orders

nor

between uiminal

and

civi l

cases

.

Assuning

the

jur i sd ic t ion ex tends

to

in te r -

l o c u t o r y a p p e a l s i n c r i a i n a l m a t t e r s , t h e j u r i s d i c t m n

i s novel.

-

It

i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t

a

ju r i sd i cc ion o f

t h a t

k ind

be

e x s r c i s e d s p a r i n g l y l e s t r c s o r t t o

t h i s Court

should in te r rupt the ord inary

and

des i rab le despa tch

of cr iminal charges in the

Supreme

Courts of

t3e

T e r r i t o r i e s .

The

j u r i s d i c t i o n

i s n o t s t e r i l e

, but

i t

should

be

exe rc i sed fo r t he pu rpose fo r vh ich the

j u r i s d i c t i o n

i s

confer red :

to

ensure

thet

j u s t i c e

i s

done

i n t h e

conduct of

c r h i n a l t r i a l s .

That

purpose

i s not achieved

by

i n t e r v e n i n g i n

ths

conduct of

a

c r i a i n a l t r i a l u n l e s s

i t

appes r s t ha t i n t e rven t ion

i s necessary

t o p r e v e n t

a

miscarr iage

of

j u s t i c e ,

In te rvant ion

is

not necessary to ensure the

el iminat ion of

a

mere

possibi l i ty of improper prejudice

a t a t r i a l ;

and t h a t

f o r

two reasons.

F i r s t , i n t?e

Event of conviction, relief

by

way

of appeal

i s

a v a i l a b l e ,

when

it

can be

s h o ~ n t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

has

becone

a

r e & l i t y

i n

t h e c o u r s e o f

t h e

t r i a l ;

and

second, the securing

0:

a f a i r t r i a l i s a duty which

a

t r l a l Judge pcrf(JmS hjr

tne saking of orders which

a r e i n

a

sense reciprocal and which

of ten t ines cannot

be considered i n

i s o l a t i o n . T h u s ,

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

of

improper

prejudice

in

the course of

a

j o i n t t r l a l

may

be

e l i g i n a t e d by

r u l i n g s on

evidence, by

the

t e r n s

o f t h e j u d g e ' s d i r e c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y ,

and

perhaps,

by

other neans

as

t h e t r l a l p r o g r e s s e s .

.

These

cons ide ra t ions l ead ne to r egs rd the

j u r i s d i c t i o n nobi

invoked

as

excep t iona l ;

t ha t

i s t o

say,

it

is a

j u r i s d i c t i o n which should not

be

exerclsed

un le s s i t appea r s t ha t

t he order appealed frog

will

e f f e c t a n i n j u s t i c e ,

and

t h a t t h e i n j u s t i c e c a n

be

avoided by

t he in t e rven t ion

of

t h l s Cour t .

I

do not th ink tha t the appel lan t has

d i s -

charged the onus of shoving that

thls

i s a case of

tha t k ind .

A t

the ouzss t

, there

i s

t h e d i f f i c u l t y

of

ident i fying the evidence

which

will

b?

a d z i t t e d on

t h e

j o i n ;

t r i a l .

S m e

of

t he

s t a t emnt s

a l l eged ly

made

by

Sco t t i n t he absence

of

t he apge l l an t

implicate

the appel

lant

though they are

inadniss ible

1

aga ins t h in ,

bu t

these pre judic ia l s ta tenents nay

or

nay

not get

Into

evidence.

If sone of

tileg

are

a d n i t t e d ,

t h e

l e a r n e d

t r i a l

j u d g e

aay

o r may

no t

be

ab le

so t o d i r e c t t h e j u r y a s t o

gi-Ie

adqauate

p r o t e c t i o n t o t h e a p p e 1 l a r . t a g a i n s t t h e i r p r e j u d i c i a l

e f f e c t .

Ru l ings on

e v i d a c e have

not y e t been

sought fron, nor

ye t been given

b y , the learned

t r i a l

judge.

Indeed,

he assumd

that

such

evidence

o f adniss ions by

S c o t t a s

would

be

a d a i t t e d would

not

nam

the

appe l l an t

a s a confederate.

If we wern %c

assuae tha t th2 s ta tenents

of

t h o s e t r l t ~ e s s e s who

were

n c t c a l l c d i n t h e c o m i t t a l p r o c e e d i n g s

would

be

ada i t t ed , t hen

h i s Honour 's assmption

110uld be

shmn

t o be

inco r rec t .

But

h i s honour has n=t yet

ruled

upon

t h e i r a d n i s s i o n , n o r ,

it

seem kas he considered

t h e e f f e c t

which

they ,

or

the adrllitted parts of

the",?

would

have

upon

t'ne

continuation of

a j o i n t Trialm

Ire

should not reach

a f ina ' l decis lon

on a

f o i n t t r i a 3

i n advance of the ilngortant

r u l i n g s which

111s

Honour

must nalre as t o evidence.

It

i s

sirnply

no t poss ib l e to p red ica t e o f

the order under appeal that

it will

be productive

of

in jus t ice .

ihch depends

upon

t h e c o d s s

which

the

t r i a l will

take and

that

i s a

course which

regains

undsr

t he con t ro l

of

%he t r i a l judge.

101 22/6/78

I

* . . .

If, as I propose

we

ihs?xLss t h i s appeal

and subsequently it appea r s t o the

Erie1 judge

t ha t s epa ra t e

tr ials should be

ordered,

i t i s open

t o h i s

Honour

so t o d i r e c t .

The

order

under

appeal

i s not perpe tua l ,

and

t h e r e f u s a l

oy

this Court

t o

in t e rvene does no t e s t a5 l i sh in

advance

that adherence

to the order cannot produce an in jus t ice ,

The

dis9issal

of

t b i s appeal i s t h e r e s u l t

of adopting the principle

( t o be

found

i n a

d l f f e r e n t

con tex t i n Sackv i l l e

1tJest v.

mrney-GeneraJ ,

1910

,

128 L.T.

265 ,andnle l l

v. Keune 1928 1 R.3.645),

t h a t

t he

j u r i s d i c t i o n

11111

not be exercised unless

it

can be

predicated, of

t h e o r d e r t h a t

i t will

e f f e c t

ar?

i n j u s t i c e

u n l e s s

t h i s Court

intervene?.

It i s

no t des i r ab le in these c i r cuns t ances tha t

I

should

make

any

fu r the r obse rva t ions

as

t o t h e f a c t s .

I

should add t h l t I would

not sugges t tha t

a t r i a l judge should adjourn a tr ial on every

occasior?

where

an

i n t i a a t i o n

i s given ' that an

app l i can t washes

t o a p p e a l .

Delay

i n a

c r ix ina l ca se

i s i t s e l f a n

i n j u s t l c e , and

a very strong case

must be

zEde

t o

warrant an adjournaent

t

o

prosecute an inter locutory

appeal

once

t h e t r i a l h a s

cmmenced.

T h i s

appeal

s h o c l d ,

i n

a y opinion

be d isn issed .

DUNE, J:

The

cons ide ra t i cns mi l i t a t ing aga ins t

a

j o i n t

t r i a l

i n

t h e p r e s e n t n a t t e r

zre

strong

Indeed.

The Crowr

p ropcss s to l ead

a

cors lderable body

o f o r a l

evi.dencs

cf

conversat jons with the appel lant ' s joint accused,

S c o t t , 7ihich

2 r e a l l e g e d t o

have

occurred,

i n the?

absente

of

t he appe l l an t , a f t e r comiss i -on o f t he

offence

charged.

These

conversetions , i f

acceptee ,

i n p l i c a t e t h e a p p e l l a n t a n d e q r e s s l y r a z e

him

a s

a c0nfederaT.e i n what the Cram a l l e g e s was

an

I

o v e r a l l c r i a i n a l a l t e r p r i s e

Exaainatlon of the proof of evidence wbici:

t he

Crown

proposes

t o l e a d f r o 5

a

sen io r nz rco t i c s

agent ,

O'Connor,

d i s c l o s e s t h a t t h e e x p e s s I m p l i c a t i m

of the appel lan t

by

S c o t t i n

h i s

o r a l s t a t m e n t s

was

t h e r e s u l t o f

8

de l ibe ra t e s t ee rmg o f cmvers sc ion

w i t h S c o t t i n

a

d i r e c t l o n which

would

i q l i c a t e

>he

appe l l an t ancl

i n a msnner

wh-:ch

was

c h l c u l a t e d t o

e l l c i t i n f o r m t i o n d m a g i n g t o t h e a p p e l l a n t

r ega rd le s s

of

t he na tu re o r

sourLe

of

S c o t t ' s

knowledge

o r be l i e? .

T'nare

i s no

d l -pu te

tha t

s i g c i f -

i c e n t p o r t i o n s

of these al lsged conversat ions

are

inadn i s s ib l e aga ins t t he appe l l an t

c

JTc/Ps/%e

102

Appara

!

l .

I n thcs?

c i rcuqs tmc:ss ,

the

reasons

for

d i r e c t i n g

s e p a r a t e

t r l a l s

which

found

f avow

wi th

I

'

!

Elr.

J u s t i c e 3ood

I n The King v . Hodgscn

( (1915) V.L.R.

119) and i4re J u s t i c e Connor i n The

Queen V.

Donaldson

and I.li3.liam

(SupreQe Court of

Aus t r a l i an

Cap i t a l

r ,

Territory

5 A p r i l 1978)

were

r e l e v a n t t o

the ques t lon

.

whether separate

t r i a l s should be

ordered i n t h e

I

present

mat ter .

His

Honom

vas

o f course , e n t i t l e d

i '

i

t o weigh aga ins t t he

abovernsr,zioned

considerasions

i

the o the r cons ide ra t ions and na t t e r s t o

which he

r e fe r r ed

and t o vinich he

paid regard.

The

quest ion whether separate

t r ia ls should

be ordered i s not

however, before us.

It i s , i n

' l

t h s

l i g h t

of

t he

conc lus ion

t o

which I hzve CO%= on

t

the

quostion

vbich

i s before

u s , unnecessary

that

I

1 '

form o r express an independent opinion

of my 3'm on

i

t h a t

. n a t t e r ,

TPe

questlon

befoI2

vs i s whether we

s h o d d

i n t c r f e r c

a t

this

s t age ,

w i th

tLe

r

fusa l

of

1'

t h e

l e a r n e d

t r i a l

jlJdg2

t o ex-Zrc ise

ths

d i

c re t ioz

i r

vh i sh

he posscssed

t o o r d e r s e p a r a t e t r i a l s .

I

e i l te r ta in ser ious doubts

as

to whe the r ,

on

the i r p ropm cona t ruL t ion ,

thr? re levant pro-r is lone

of

the Federhl Ccurt

02

Acs t ra l i a Act

1576 confer

t . .

L:

l u r i s d i c t l o n w o n t h i s court C O hesr

a n awLeal

fyon

- c

i h e r e f u s a l o f - t h e t r i a l

juGge

t o e x e r c l s e

a

d iscre t ionary

power

t o order

separate

tr ials. Evven

assunir.g

that

such

a refusal

can

properly

be reggrcled

-. I

as

in te r lccutory

an

"order t9 ,

here

i s nuch t o be

i

said

f o r

t h e

v i e v

t h a s

upon

the i r

p rope r

cons t ruc t i cn

f-..

iu

t he con teP t o f e s t ab l i shed p r inc ip l e s r e l a t iog

to

1.;

the rdture of an appeal

and

t h e c i r c m s t a n c z s

12 which

-

-7

at?

appea l shou ld o rd ina r i ly l i e ,

t h2

general provisJ

ons

of s.24

of the r 'ederal

Coul-t. ofluustrnlia

Act do n u t

i .

confer

aut'nority

t o institute,

o r

j h r l s d i c t i o n

t

f-.

hear ,

appeal

n

f rm

m

in te r locu to ry

o rde r

i n

a

g

crilninal prcceeding.

f

The

Crown

has

tovever

expressly

dis-

clainej.

any

subnlss ion tha t

the cour t

l acks

jur is-

d i c t ion

to hea r

t he appea l .

The

o ther rlle-.ibers

oi"

t h e Bench

i n c l i n e

ts the

view

th;hat

j u r i sd i c t lon does

ex is t .

It

i s c l e a r l y d e s i r a b l e

t h a t

a

dec is ion be

given forthwith.

In all t he

s i r cu5s t ances9

and

i n

view of t h e concluslon which I have i n amy event reached

3s

t o t h e n e r i t s

or'

the

a p p a l , i'

an p r e p a r e d t o

concur

in dea l ing v i th the 2 l a t t e r

on

the

basis

thsi.

ju l i sd i c t ion to hea r t he appea l dozs

e x i s t .

JD/PS/Se

22/6 /7P

Appara

On

the

assunpti-on t h q t

j u r i s d i c t i o n t o

hear and deterqine %he a?peal does

exlst It I all i n

agreement liith Ifflat 3renr.m

J.

has

said a s t o t h e

pr inciples vhlch should govern

i t s e x s r c i s e I n

a

I

,

matter

such

as the p re sen t c

Generally

speaking, I

would

apply

t o t h e p r e s e n t m t t e r t h e p r i n c i p l c s

I

I

.

a

I

e m ~ n c i a t e d . i n t h e c o n t a t

of

c iv i l p rocced lngs ,

by

the Cou&

of Apoeal i n Sac l iv i l l e - ik s t v .

Attorney=

General (L&. (1928) 1

K . 3 .

645)

and ci ted with

approval in ?laxwell v.

Keune

& Ors.

(1910) 128 L.T.Jo.

265

and

aany

o ther cascs .

I

a l s o ag ree

fo r

t he

. reason9 which he has given

w i t h ny

brother Brennan's

conclusion thzt the appel lanb has not

made

out

a

case

f o r i n t e r f e r i n g

w i t h

the

r e f u s a l

by

t he l ea rned

t r i a l judge

t o e x a - c i s e

h i s

d i s c r e t i o n t c order

a

s e p a r a t e t r i a l i n t h e p r e s e n t m a t t e r .

I n t h e

resu l t

I

ag ree tha t t he agpea l

s h o d d be

disnisser l .

In

%e

event

that

thc

appel

lenz

subsequently renews his application

f o r a

separate

t r - i a l ,

the

success

or

f a i l u r e

of

t h a t a p p l i c s t i o n

should not

be regarded as governed by the dec is ion

of this eppeal. That

will be a n a t t z r for the

judge

of

the

Supreme

Gourt

of

the Nor thern Ter r i to ry to

whon

s>Jch appi icet ion i s made,

TOOHEY, J: I agree the appeal

should

oe

d i m i s s e d ;

I agree

with the reasons

of

h i s Eonour , Mr.

Just ice Srennan.

BRENNAN, J:

The order of the C m r t i s t h a t the appeal i s

c?ismissed.

JFc/Ps/lc

104

22/6/78

Appara

Details
AGLC
McNamara, Peter v The Queen [1978] FCA 51
Case
[1978] FCA 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of McNamara v The Queen, the appellant, McNamara, sought to appeal against the decision of the trial judge to refuse a request for a separate trial from his co-accused, Scott. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Federal Court had the jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal in a criminal matter and, if so, whether the appeal should be allowed. The court also considered the principles guiding the exercise of such jurisdiction.

The court found that the Federal Court did have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals in criminal matters under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. However, the court held that this jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly to avoid disrupting the ordinary and desirable dispatch of criminal charges in the Supreme Courts of the Territories. The court determined that the appeal should not be allowed because it was not established that the order under appeal would result in injustice unless the court intervened. The court emphasised that it is not desirable to make a final decision on the admissibility of evidence or the need for separate trials before the trial judge has had the opportunity to rule on these matters.

The court dismissed the appeal and noted that if the appellant were to renew his application for a separate trial, the success or failure of that application should be determined by the judge of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The court's decision underscored the importance of allowing trial judges to exercise their discretion in managing the proceedings of criminal trials, subject to review in the event of a miscarriage of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.