McCourt and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

This matter concerned an appeal by the applicant, Mr McCourt, against a decision by the Secretary of the Department of Social Services regarding the start date of his Age Pension payments. Mr McCourt was injured in a fall in August 2015, rendering him unable to manage his affairs. His former wife, acting as his carer, attempted to lodge an Age Pension application online shortly after the accident, encountering difficulties. She subsequently contacted Centrelink by phone around 15 September 2015, indicating the applicant's intention to apply. Centrelink sent application materials, which included a letter stating that payments would be backdated to the date of the initial contact if the application was lodged within 14 days; otherwise, payments would commence from the date of the application. The applicant's carer, not fully appreciating the 14-day timeframe, eventually submitted the completed application on 24 December 2015, resulting in the pension being granted but payments commencing from that later date.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant was entitled to have his Age Pension payments backdated to his initial contact with Centrelink on or about 15 September 2015, despite the application being lodged significantly later on 24 December 2015. This involved determining whether there were "special circumstances" that would permit an extension of the 14-day application time limit, and whether the relevant legislation provided a discretion to extend this limit beyond the initial 14 days, or even a further 13-week period. The applicant argued that his severe injuries and resulting inability to attend to the paperwork constituted unfair treatment.

The court affirmed the decision under review, finding that the legislation did not permit backdating payments due to the substantial delay in lodging the application. The presiding SM noted that even if a discretion to extend time existed, the applicant's circumstances did not warrant its exercise. The court highlighted that Centrelink cannot be expected to be aware of a person's difficulties unless informed, and the lack of any action or communication on the applicant's behalf for approximately 13 weeks weighed against the exercise of any discretionary power. The court concluded that the applicant's argument relied on the respondent retrospectively becoming aware of his circumstances, which was an insufficient basis for requiring the exercise of a discretionary power.